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This dissertation investigates the driving forces behind the emerging phenomenon 
of “organizational modularity”, by which firms create “virtual” organizations through 
outsourcing functions, by using contract manufacturers, by forming alliances, and by 
using temporary employment contracts, as they organize their activities within supply 
chains.  Using transaction cost analysis as the overarching theoretical framework for the 
analysis, a number of hypotheses that relate industry structure to modularity are 
developed.  A large scale industry-level data set is used to test the hypotheses.  Statistical 
results show that heterogeneity of supply sources, and scale economies in focal and 
downstream industries, are positively associated with greater use of modular forms, 
whereas other factors, such as the concentration of upstream and downstream industries, 
are associated with less modularity.  In the current outsourcing environment, these 
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
“There is no doubt that we are living in a modular age.” 
- Garud, Kumaraswamy, and Langlois (2003), p.8 
 
“To Be Modular or Not to Be?” 
- Ketchen and Hult, 2002 
 
 “Managers facing today’s difficult environment are 
engaged in organizational experiments without the 
guidance and benefit of theories and models that would 
characterize the new paradigm.  The experiments 
undertaken by organizations carry labels such as modular 
organization, virtual corporation …network organization” 
- Daft and Lewin, 1993, pp. i-ii 
 
“…a modularity theory of the firm.” 
- Langlois, 2002, p. 19 
 
“I view the emergence of the modular production network 
as part of a historical process of industrial transformation in 
which nationally specific models of industrial organization 
co-evolve in intensifying rounds of competition, diffusion 
and adaptation.” (p. 451) 
“In the electronics industry, at least, it is clear that the 
modular production network model has put a great deal of 
pressure on competing networks emanating from Europe 
and Japan.” (p. 490) 
- Sturgeon, 2002 
 
Modular Organization as a New Organizational Paradigm 
A recent research stream has characterized a new industrial phenomenon by the 
phrase “organizational modularity” that extends beyond firm boundary issues of using 
”make” or “buy” alternatives to manage complex economic organizations (Sturgeon, 
2002, 2003; White, 2000).  Organizational modularity is a continuum of measuring the 
degree of firms’ usage of integrative, cooperative or hierarchical organizational 
arrangements with external business entities to minimize system-wide production and 
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transaction costs and increase value (Christensen, Verlinden, and Westerman, 2002; 
Schilling and Steensma, 2001).  Manufacturing industries have been the major focus of 
the modularity literature.  As an application of organizational modularity in the 
manufacturing industries, a modular production organization is a production system 
consisting of autonomous business entities linked by non-trivial integrative, cooperative 
and hierarchical governance structures with a goal of minimizing system-wide production 
and transaction costs and maximizing value (Daft and Lewin, 1993; Dyer, 1997; 
Langlois, 2002; Langlois and Robertson, 1995; Schilling and Steensma, 2001; Sturgeon, 
2002; Williamson, 1991a; Zenger and Hesterly, 1997).  This organizational modularity 
phenomenon has the potential to display an on-going paradigm shift (Best, 1990; Daft 
and Lewin, 1993; Sturgeon, 2002), and the impact can be as large as a Second Industrial 
Revolution (Achrol, 1997).  Modularity researchers thus have enthusiastically called for 
the development of a modularity theory of the firm (Langlois, 2002; Schilling and 
Steensma, 2001; Tu et al. 2004). 
Modularity researchers have coined several terms to describe the emergence of 
modular production organizations: modular network (Hoogeweegen, Teunissen, Vervest 
and Wagenaar, 1999), modularity-based manufacturing practices (Tu et al., 2004), 
modular organizational form (Schilling and Steensma, 2001), and modular production 
networks (Sturgeon, 2002).  A parallel research stream provides several terms describing 
this trend to networked organization structure: virtual organizations (Daft and Lewin, 
1993; Davidow and Malone, 1992; Pine II, 1993), modular organization (Schilling and 
Steensma, 2001; Sturgeon, 2002), network organization (or strategic network) (Gulati, 
1998; Miles and Snow, 1993; Powell, 1987).  In this study, we use “modular 
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organization” to describe the production networks that are linked by autonomous 
business organizations with integrative governance structures.  “Organizational 
modularity” is used to describe the degree of an industry’s cooperative organizational 
arrangement. 
Practices of Modular Organizations 
Organizational modularity goes beyond traditional concepts concerning typical 
firm boundaries and encompasses multiple aspects of inter-firm arrangements.  In order 
to achieve strategic flexibility in highly competitive markets, modular organizations often 
adopt inter-firm practices, including outsourcing a significant number of manufacturing 
activities, frequently establishing strategic alliances, and hiring a large number of short-
term or temporary employees (Hitt, Keats, and DeMarie, 1998; Schilling and Steensma, 
2001; Ketchen and Hult, 2002; Stratman, Roth, and Gilland, 2004; Tu et al., 2004; Van 
Hoek and Weken, 1998).  First, contract manufacturing has become a crucial means for 
firms to respond to changes in the marketplace and to adjust production capacities.  
Recently, suppliers in several manufacturing industries, such as automobile and 
electronics, have begun to participate more fully in the production processes.  The focal 
firms take charge of the most crucial coordination functions.  The scope of contract 
manufacturing, hence, can range from the production of conventional raw materials or 
semi-finished parts to fully operated contract assembly operations.  Secondly, strategic 
alliances are voluntary and cooperative long-term agreements between firms to share 
valuable resources (Gulati, 1998).  Alliances allow firms to explore and exploit the 
strategic resources that are difficult to obtain through market mechanisms or vertical 
integration.  Finally, utilizing external workforce has also become a method for firms to 
 4
achieve flexibility for employment.  In addition to the conventional practice of hiring 
minimally skilled temporary workers, more firms are also hiring high-quality employees 
on a contingency basis without keeping them on the payroll as permanent workers 
(Schilling and Steensma, 2001).  
Observers of economic organizations have pointed out that organizational 
modularity can be sustained in the long run (Langlois, 2002; Powell, 1987; Zenger and 
Hesterly, 1997).  Specifically, modularity research has suggested that industrial factors, 
such as heterogeneity, industry concentration, technology, industrial standardization, 
increased competitive pressure, product innovation, pursuit for flexibility, and global 
supply chain management, have driven entrepreneurs to carry out organizational 
experiments by altering inter-firm governance structure options (Angeres, 1999; Cool and 
Henderson, 1998; Daft and Lewin, 1993; Bettis and Hitt, 1995; Barreyre, 1988; Garud 
and Munir, 2003; Hoetker, 2002; Langlois and Foss, 1999; Langlois and Robertson, 
1995; Malone, Yates, and Benjamin, 1987; Schilling and Steensma, 2001; Sturgeon, 
2002; Zenger and Hesterly, 1997).  Firms in various manufacturing industries have 
transformed their industrial structures through building integrative relationships with 
other supply chain partners instead of utilizing market mechanisms or adopting vertical 
integration (Achrol, 1997; Schilling and Steensma, 2001; Sturgeon, 2002).  Industries 
successfully implementing organizational modularity include the computer (Baldwin and 
Clark, 1997), electronics (Sturgeon, 2002), automobile (Hsuah 1999; Salerno, 2001), 
semiconductor (Machor, Mowery and Simcoe, 2002), and bicycle (Galvin and Morkel, 
2001) industries. 
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There can also be several intangible inter-firm practices displaying organizational 
modularity that can be alternatives to contracts, such as trust building, relational 
contracting, social network relationships, etc. (Dyer, 1996; Gulati, 1998; Schilling and 
Steensma, 2001).  This dissertation focuses on three dimensions of modularity – contract 
manufacturing, strategic alliance, and alternative employment arrangement, as presented 
in the prior discussion (Ketchen and Hult, 2002; Schilling and Steensma, 2001; Tu et al., 
2004).  We leave the other more intangible dimensions of organizational modularity for 
future research. 
Implications of Modular Organizations to Supply Chain Management 
Organizational modularity practices, i.e. contract manufacturing, alliance 
formation, and alternative employment (Schilling and Steensma, 2001), are largely 
associated with supply chain management (SCM) (Ketchen and Hult, 2002; Schilling and 
Steensma, 2001; Tu et al. 2004).  A supply chain consists of many related firms, 
including suppliers, manufacturers, distributors, wholesalers, and retailers, that 
coordinate with each other through various inter-firm governance structures (Chopra and 
Meindl, 2001; Christopher, 1998).  Firms can choose to perform all supply chain 
functions on their own, or coordinate these functions with other firms in the supply chain.  
Modular production organizations provide an additional coordination option, allowing 
firms to coordinate with other supply chain partners by building a hierarchical 
relationship, while at the same time maintaining a degree of autonomy (Daft and Lewin, 
1993; Schilling and Steensma, 2001; Williamson, 1991a). 
As competition has evolved to “supply chain against supply chain” (Christopher, 
1998) or “network against network” (Gulati, 1998; Gulati, Nohria and Zaheer, 2000), the 
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understanding of organizational modularity is of crucial importance.  The decisions 
concerning a firm’s governance structures interact with those of its supply chain partners 
(Fine, 1998; Langlois and Robertson, 1995; Sturgeon, 2002).  Utilizing modularity can 
result in not only the reconfiguration of a firm or a buyer-supplier relationship, but also 
the structure of the whole supply chain. Furthermore, the boundary-spanning nature of 
organizational modularity can lead to the structural reconfiguration of manufacturers and 
their upstream and downstream partner industries (Sturgeon, 2002; Van Hoek and 
Weken, 1998).  Ultimately, the performance of a modular organization will be correlated 
with the performance of other supply chain partners. 
Organization management researchers have suggested that managers are 
conducting the current wave of organizational innovation, including modular 
organizations, without the guidance of theories (Daft and Lewin, 1993).  Based on our 
literature review, albeit the burgeoning interest in the modularity phenomenon by 
researchers, established management theories, e.g., Transaction Cost Economics (TCE), 
Resource-Based View, Strategic Network, Structure-Conduct-Performance, etc., have not 
yet been fully incorporated into modularity research.  As stated by modularity theorists, 
“we cannot talk about co-evolutionary dynamics associated with the disaggregation of 
technical and organizational forms without reflecting upon the transaction costs and 
translations costs involved,” (Garud, Kumaraswamy, and Langlois, 2003, p. 7).  
Therefore, the preceding observations motivate this dissertation to investigate 
organizational modularity from the perspective of TCE.  This dissertation aims to 
establish a conceptual model that analyzes organizational modularity from both the SCM 
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and TCE perspectives, to develop testable hypotheses, and to conduct empirical tests for 
the proposed conceptual model. 
Implications of Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) to Modular Organization 
TCE is related to issues about the costs of transactions in the marketplace and the 
alignment of firm boundaries to minimize transaction costs (Williamson, 1975; 1985).  
TCE categorizes inter-firm governance structures with three generic modes: market 
mechanisms, hierarchy (or vertical integration), and a hybrid mode that displays 
attributes of the previous two modes (Powell, 1987; Williamson, 1985, 1995).  TCE 
points out that in the presence of transaction costs, firms tend to build more integrative 
governance structures with other firms rather than use market mechanisms (Shelanski and 
Klein, 1995; Williamson, 1975; 1985; 1995). 
Both TCE and modularity research acknowledge that economic organizations are 
complex systems, and modularity analysts have proposed that organizational modularity 
is a means to manage complex economic systems in the presence of transaction costs 
(Langlois, 2002; Sanchez, 1997).  Organizational modularity provides an additional 
alternative to the conventional dichotomous make-or-buy decisions of the firm, since the 
dimensions of organizational modularity (i.e. contract manufacturing, alliance formation, 
and alternative employment) display integrative attributes of a hybrid organizational 
mode.  We thus theorize that organizational modularity is an alternative to market 
mechanisms and hierarchy with respect to the firm’s boundary decisions in the supply 
chain (Achrol, 1997; Fine, 1998; Zenger and Hesterly, 1997).  Below is the highlight of 
this view, and full discussion will be offered in chapter 3. 
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This dissertation makes some fundamental TCE arguments.  First, managers in a 
focal industry have options of using “make” (hierarchy, close-coupling, or vertical 
integration), “ally” (hybrid, or loose-coupling) or “buy” (market mechanisms, or de-
coupling) decisions when planning to organize their production system and firm or 
industry boundaries (Boerner and Macher, 2002; Shelanski and Klein, 1995; White, 
2000; Williamson, 1995).  These three options display different degrees of integration.  
Specifically, the “make” option is the most integrative, the “ally” option is in the middle 
of the governance spectrum, and the “buy” option is the least integrative.  Therefore, the 
“ally” option, or hybrid arrangement, including long-term contracts, joint ventures and/or 
formal alliances, is more integrative or hierarchical than the market option.  Along this 
line, the dimensions of organizational modularity, i.e. contract manufacturing, alliance 
formation, and alternative employment (Ketchen and Hult, 2002; Schilling and Steensma, 
2001; Tu et al., 2004), are cooperative arrangements to coordinate activities between 
firms in the focal industry and other firms, and are more hierarchical and integrative 
governance structures in comparison to spot market mechanisms.  Since the three 
dimensions of organizational modularity display attributes that are consistent with TCE’s 
hybrid governance structure based on the preceding discussion, we propose 
organizational modularity to be an illustration of the hybrid governance structure.  
It has been observed that there are two directions of formations for modular 
organizations, and both adopt integrative inter-firm organizational approaches (Powell, 
1987; Zenger and Hesterly, 1997).  One is the infusion of market mechanisms into 
conventional hierarchy, as observed in most extant modularity literature.  The other is the 
incorporation of integrative inter-firm arrangements with market mechanisms, such as 
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long-term buyer-supplier contracts and strategic alliances.  We will discuss these two 
directions in the following sections.  
Perspectives concerning Organizational Modularity as an Alternative to Vertical 
Integration 
Management literature has described the modular organization as a system 
consisting of loosely coupled, decomposable, autonomous, interconnected, coordinated, 
and decentralized parts (Daft and Lewin, 1993; Williamson, 1995; Schilling and 
Steensma, 2001).  In most of the modularity literature, researchers have argued that in the 
long run, vertical integration can often be replaced with separate firms connected by 
contracts.  The pursuit of strategic flexibility can serve as the main reason to sustain 
modularity under heterogeneous business environments (Zenger and Hesterly, 1997; 
Angeres, 1999; Schilling and Steensma, 2001).  Although vertical integration of supply 
chain functions can facilitate the coordination of manufacturing processes under 
relatively stable conditions, vertical integration can result in competitive disadvantages 
such as obsolescence and inflexibility in changing environments (Mahoney, 1992; Porter, 
1980; Williamson, 1975).  Additionally, high entry barriers can make vertical integration 
a formidable task for focal industry firm managers because of the high costs of 
investment (Achrol, 1997; Porter, 1980; Sanchez, 1999).  In contrast, components in a 
modular system can leverage the advantages of codified information and standards to 
coordinate and communicate, and thus reduce transaction costs (Langlois and Robertson, 
1995; Sturgeon, 2002).  Because transaction costs between manufacturers and their 
suppliers could diminish in the long run, loosely coupling links can be used as a 
substitute of vertical integration, while the production system demonstrates higher 
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modularity.  Modularity researchers, thus, have argued that vertically integrated 
organizations can oftentimes be replaced with loosely coupled modular organizations 
firms (Schilling and Steensma, 2001; Sturgeon, 2002).  
Perspectives concerning Organizational Modularity as an Alternative to Both Vertical 
Integration and Market Mechanisms 
As discussed earlier, the dimensions of organizational modularity display 
integrative attributes of the hybrid mode, so modularity is thus considered more 
hierarchical than pure market mechanisms (Oxley, 1999; Gulati and Singh, 1998; 
Williamson, 1995).  To date, modularity scholars have only explained modularity as an 
alternative to vertical integration.  For instance, Schilling and Steensma (2001) stated, 
“Systems are said to have a high degree of modularity when their components can be 
disaggregated and recombined into new configurations – possibly with new components 
– with little loss of functionality” (p. 1151).  However, modularity researchers have 
provided little interpretation as to why firms might choose to utilize modularity as an 
alternative to both vertical integration and market mechanisms when organizing inter-
firm production processes (Zenger and Hesterly, 1997).  As modularity researchers 
pointed out, organizational modularity emerges in the integration-disintegration-
reintegration cycles (Chesbrough and Kusunoki, 2001; Fine, 1998).  In other words, a 
firm’s choice between hierarchy, modularity, and market mechanisms can be a dynamic 
process, and can be adjusted according to changes in the business environments. 
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Research Questions 
The foregoing discussion on the gaps in the modularity literature, and modularity 
researchers’ calls for a modularity theory of the firm (Langlois, 2002; Sturgeon, 2002), 
motivate us to investigate organizational modularity from a different angle. Specifically, 
we ask the following questions:  
1. What are the factors that drive a manufacturing industry to use organizational 
modularity rather than market mechanisms in supply chains?  Why do some 
industries display higher organizational modularity than others?  
2. To what extent will these factors affect firm choice of organizational 
modularity? 
3. Can modularity be explained by the Transaction Costs Economics theory? 
4. How can supply chain management perspectives provide insights into the 
organizational modularity phenomenon? 
5. When should firms use organizational modularity to coordinate supply chain 
activities in order to minimize transaction costs? 
Preview of the Theoretical Framework 
This dissertation provides an industry-level study and incorporates SCM and TCE 
perspectives to analyze the drivers of organizational modularity.  We use TCE as the 
overarching theory to develop our conceptual model and testable hypotheses.  Our 
intention is not to measure industry level transaction costs directly, but to examine the 
impacts on organizations of relevant variables that can potentially generate transaction 
costs.  We argue that the organizational modularity of the focal manufacturing industry is 
a function of the attributes of the upstream and downstream supply chain industries and 
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of the focal industry, and that firms establish modular production organizations to 
account for not only production costs but also transaction costs.  Supply chain attributes 
include the overall supply and demand heterogeneity, scale economies, and levels of 
concentration of upstream and downstream industries.  A focal industry’s attributes 
include the length of distribution channel, scale economies, and the level of 
concentration. 
This dissertation attempts to make several contributions to the modularity 
literature.  First, by applying TCE and supply chain notions, this dissertation theorizes 
that organizational modularity is an alternative to vertical integration and to market 
mechanisms.  In doing so, we have re-positioned modularity in the literature.  
Furthermore, this dissertation contributes to the modularity literature by providing a 
conceptual model and empirical analyses pertaining to the driving forces behind the 
organizational modularity phenomenon.  The complete discussion of our contributions 
will be offered in chapter 6. 
Summary 
Scholars from various research fields have viewed organizational modularity as a 
crucial phenomenon.  The extant modularity literature views modularity as an alternative 
of vertical integration.  In contrast, this dissertation views modularity as an alternative to 
both vertical integration and market mechanisms.  By positioning organizational 
modularity in a broader theoretical framework of inter-firm governance structures, this 
industry-level research fills the gap in the modularity literature. 
The purpose of this dissertation is to develop a model that analyzes organizational 
modularity from both TCE and SCM perspectives, and empirically tests the hypotheses.  
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This will contribute to the literature concerning the knowledge of the linkages between 
organizational modularity and its drivers in industrial supply chains.  The findings of this 
study can also offer a more comprehensive theory with regard to organizational 
modularity that can guide managers to arrange buyer-supplier relationships. 
The remaining sections of this dissertation are arranged as follows:  Chapter 2 
reviews empirical work on organizational modularity, with a complementary discussion 
of selective conceptual works.  Chapter 3 provides the theory for the drivers of 
organizational modularity and develops testable hypotheses.  Chapter 4 illustrates the 
measures and describes how the relevant variables are operationalized.  Chapter 5 details 
the statistical procedures to test hypotheses and provides discussion on the testing results. 
Finally, the dissertation concludes with a discussion of contribution in chapter 6. 
 14
CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
The body of knowledge concerning organizational modularity has intersected 
fields such as organization management, supply chain management (SCM), operations 
management, strategic management, marketing management, and industrial economics.  
In this chapter we review the most relevant modularity studies in the foregoing areas, 
most of which are empirical.  We also review parallel research that has applied 
Transaction Costs Economics (TCE) in order to analyze the interaction between inter-
firm transaction attributes and the choice of governance structures. 
Organization Management Literature 
Organization scholars were the first to investigate the phenomenon of modular 
organizations (see Daft and Lewin, 1993).  Their contributions focus on how technology 
innovation and uncertainty in business environments can affect organizational 
innovations, such as the formation of virtual networks and modular organizations 
(Argyres, 1999; Lei, Hitt and Goldhar, 1996; Sanchez, 1997; Thompson, 1967; Upton, 
1997).  Virtual organizations can serve as an alternative to vertical integration, especially 
when vertical ownership can cause diseconomies of scale and competitive disadvantages 
such as obsolescence due to organizational inflexibility in changing environments 
(Argyres, 1999). 
Zenger and Hesterly (1997) have suggested that two emerging trends can change 
an initially integrated industrial organization.  One is the infusion of hierarchy 
mechanisms into the market mechanisms, and the other is the infusion of market 
mechanisms into a hierarchy mechanism.  If a firm’s capacity is not sufficient, it will 
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have to decide whether to develop cooperative links with supply chain partners, or 
whether to adopt market mechanisms or vertical integration (Argyres, 1999; Zenger and 
Hesterley, 1997).  Innovative integrative organizational governance structures, such as 
modular production systems, have been employed by firms as an alternative to pure 
market mechanisms and vertical integration (Daft and Lewin, 1993; Miles and Snow, 
1987, 1993; Powell, 1987).  These inter-firm integrative arrangements can link sequential 
supply chain echelons across firms and industries in order to vertically coordinate 
manufacturing processes (Argyres, 1999). 
Supply Chain Management Literature 
SCM researchers have found that modularity can bring forth the adjustments to 
supply chain structures (Towill and McCullen, 1999; Van Hoek and Weken, 1998).  
Modularity of product designs and supply chain processes can also redefine the divisions 
between supply chain stages, and transform the traditional buyer-supplier relationships 
(Hines and Rich, 1998; Hsuan, 1999; Van Hoek and Weken, 1998).  Furthermore, the 
development of information technology has provided more options for managers to 
design virtual supply chains (Bal, Wilding and Gundry, 1999; Chandrashekar and Schary, 
1999).  Finally, the pursuit of strategic flexibility in terms of customization, changeover 
of production lines, product variety, order processing efficiency, and so forth, can be 
factors that drive firms to adopt organizational modularity (Bal, Wilding and Gundry, 
1999; Van Hoek and Weken, 1998). 
Organizational modularity can have profound impacts.  Proper planning and 
design for a modular organization can help supply chains focus on specific supply chain 
functions, avoid the rigidity and inflexibility of highly integrated structures, and save 
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transaction costs as well as production costs (Chandrashekar and Schary, 1999; Towill 
and McCullen, 1999).  Moreover, establishing cooperative buyer-seller relationships can 
strengthen a firm’s competitive position (Landeros and Monczka, 1989) and result in 
high performance for the supply chain partners or the whole strategic alliance (Skjoett-
Larse, Thernoe and Andresen, 2003; Whipple and Frankel, 2000).  Specifically, inter-
organizational logistics systems in flexible production networks can provide 
complementary capabilities for manufacturers and logistics service providers (Pfohl and 
Buse, 2000).  Supply chain collaboration can reduce the impacts of demand and velocity 
fluctuation (Fine, 1998, p. 94), and integrative governance structures can be more agile, 
flexible and adaptive in coping with uncertainties incurred in supply chains (Vickery, 
Calantone, and Droge, 1999; Weber, 2002). 
Several supply chain collaborative initiatives can change the scope of firms.  
Examples can be found in the current information sharing SCM programs, such as 
electronic data interchange (EDI), vender-managed inventory (VMI) and quick-
response/efficient customer response (QR/ECR) solutions (Coyle, Bardi, and Langley, 
1996).  These organizational arrangements, as well as technology initiatives, can change 
the landscape of an industry and the configuration of the entire supply chain network, 
since integrative arrangements between supply chain members reassign the functions of 
different supply chain partners (Lowson, 2003; Phillips and Phillips, 1998; Van Hoek and 
Weken, 1998). 
Another research stream has applied TCE to investigate supply management 
issues.  Ellram (1991) suggests that a focal firm should develop integrative contractual 
relationships with suppliers in highly concentrated industries, so that they can assure 
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accessibility to inputs.  Whipple, Frankel and Anselmi, (1999) also found that firms 
should devise hybrid-integrative organizational form to protect high relationship-specific 
investments, e.g. customized packaging.  In sum, firms in the supply chain should 
implement coordination mechanisms in order to minimize the transaction costs resulted 
from uncertainties in inter-firm relationships, and fluctuations in order quantity, 
production quantity, and inventory levels. 
Operations Management Literature 
Operations management researchers contribute to the modularity literature with 
regards to the relationships between product modularity and modular manufacturing 
systems.  Product modularity has important implication for organizational modularity.  
First, modularization of product and process design can create higher product variety, 
enhance manufacturing flexibility and facilitate manufacturing competencies (Berry and 
Cooper, 1999; Narasimhan, Talluri and Das, 2004).  In addition, the configurations of 
supply chains can be strategically designed through various combinations of 
modularization and postponement (Ernst and Kamrad, 2000).  Firms may reconfigure 
their production networks that correspond to the modules of the products (Ernst and 
Kamrad, 2000).  The creation of modularity in product technology, hence, can 
reconfigure the design of supply chains and increase capabilities in customization (Duray 
et al., 2000; Ernst and Kamrad, 2000; Salvador, Forza and Rungtusanatham, 2002).  
Ultimately, appropriate alignment between product designs and modular organizational 
forms can strongly reinforce design performance and teams cooperation (Sosa, Eppinger, 
and Rowles, 2004). 
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Customization is important in driving modularity.  Supply chain members are 
under increasing pressure to customize products and services to meet heterogeneous 
market needs (Pine, 1993).  It is thus very critical for managers to arrange proper 
organizational structures that can obtain strategic flexibility in their supply chain 
operations (Lampel and Mintzberg, 1996).  Firms have employed information and 
communication technology to design supply chain processes and allocate production 
tasks in modular organizations (Hoogeweegen et al., 1999; Tu et al., 2004).  This 
organizational modularity can provide firms in the supply chains with accesses to 
complementary resources to pool capabilities for customization (Pires, 1998; Salerno, 
2001). 
Operations management literature has documented research concerning the 
performance implications of the modularity phenomenon.  Ethiraj and Levinthal (2004a) 
use a simulation method to find the optimal level of modularity that can maximize 
innovation outcomes in complex organizations.  Further, researchers find that modularity 
in the form of supply chain collaboration can enhance distribution flexibility (Daugherty 
and Pittman, 1995).  Another research stream specifically investigates one of the major 
dimensions of organizational modularity, alternative employment arrangements.  
Researchers explore the benefits and hazards of employing temporary workers in 
production systems (Stratman, Roth, and Gilland, 2004). 
Strategic Management Literature 
Management literature has made the most extensive contribution to the 
understanding of the industrial evolvement toward modular organization.  Schilling and 
Steensma (2001) conducted the first extensive industry level empirical study of 
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organizational modularity and made a significant contribution to operationlizing 
organizational modularity.  Organizational modularity is measured by combining three 
managerial dimensions; that is, contract manufacturing, alliance formation, and 
temporary employment.  Schilling and Steensma (2001) found that combined industrial 
heterogeneity, from both the upstream and downstream sides, can have positive impacts 
on a manufacturing industry’s organizational modularity.  The authors did not distinguish 
the respective effects of input and demand heterogeneity on organizational modularity; 
however, they found that the heterogeneity-modularity relationship can be influenced by 
several complex moderating effects. 
Several papers have contributed knowledge about the conditions that can drive the 
usage of organizational modularity.  First, firms adopt organizational modularity in order 
to allocate their resources in the supply chains. Firms can learn about their own strength 
and supply chain partner capabilities through cooperative arrangements, so that they can 
optimize their scope of operations (Brusoni, Prencipe and Pavitt, 2001; Galunic and 
Eisenhardt, 2001).  Furthermore, firms may utilize more hierarchical inter-firm 
governance structures when there are only small numbers of supply chain partners, so 
that they can safeguard the interdependent relationships with supply chain partners 
(Gulati and Singh, 1998).  Also, inter-firm collaboration raises the concerns of 
opportunistic behaviors of supply chain participants, and hence more administrative 
control has to be implemented in the inter-firm exchange (Osburn et al., 1998). 
Several works employed qualitative or computational approaches to study how 
modularity can contribute to operational performance.  Modular organizational forms can 
enhance the exchange and combination of competitive resources between other supply 
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chain partners and thereby achieve greater diversification and scope economies (Helfat 
and Eisenhardt, 2004).  Another implication associated with the combinations of 
complementary resources is the capability to carry out new processes and designs (Garud 
and Kumaraswamy, 1995; Martin and Eisenhardt, 2003).  Furthermore, coordination 
mechanisms between firms in a modular supply chain can enhance the value of inter-firm 
exchange and reduce transaction costs (Baldwin and Clark, 2003; Dyer, 1997).  Using a 
computational approach, Ethiraj and Levinthal (2004b) found that modular design and 
organizational modularity should be complementary to substantiate the design 
effectiveness. 
In brief, strategy scholars have made the most significant contribution to the 
modularity literature by operationalizing organizational modularity and exploring the 
driving forces of this phenomenon. Prominent strategy theories applied in this literature 
include Resource-Based View (RBV) (Schilling and Steensma, 2001) and Schumpeter’s 
(1942) Creative Destruction (Sanchez and Mahoney, 1996) theories.  It appears that TCE 
has yet been extensively incorporated by researchers to to investigate issues related to 
modularity. 
Marketing Literature 
Modularity research in the marketing management literature has suggested that 
organizational modularity can be an alternative to vertical integration.  In particular, 
Achrol (1991, 1997) has observed a new business model in the U.S. emerging such that 
large, vertically integrated firms begin to divide their supply chain functions, such as 
R&D, logistics, production, or marketing, and oftentimes outsource these functions 
through integrative, cooperative links with supply chain partners.  These links are 
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illustrations of modular organizational forms (Sanchez, 1999; Wilson, Weiss, and John, 
1990).  Moreover, the drivers of organizational modularity include greater competition, 
pressure to achieve flexibility, responsiveness to market demands, and pursuit of cost 
reductions in marketing channels (Achrol, 1997; Sanchez, 1999).  Functions of the supply 
chain are all candidates for outsourcing and there can be numerous inter-organizational 
cooperative relationships to arrange modular organizational structures (Stremersch et al., 
2003). 
Several additional research streams related to inter-firm hybrid governance 
structures are very relevant to the research questions of this dissertation.  Marketing 
provides strong empirical evidence of hybrid governance structures, even though they do 
not use language such as organizational modularity or modular organizations.  In the 
following discussion, we present marketing studies applying TCE to examine how the 
properties of transactions affect the transaction costs and governance structure choices.  
Furthermore, marketing channel researchers have found that buyers and suppliers use the 
hybrid governance structures, e.g. alliances, joint ventures, cooperative arrangements, 
relational contracting, as an alternative to market mechanisms and vertical integration, to 
save transaction costs as well as safeguard relationships. 
Marketing literature has extensively investigated various market failure issues that 
can lead to high transaction costs. Exchange hazards can result from various sources.  
The presence of opportunism can increase bargaining and monitoring costs, between 
channel members (Dahlstrom and Nygaard, 1999).  Supply chain members may need to 
make greater financial or labor commitment when they conduct higher valued 
transactions with partners (Buvik and Andersen, 2002; Buvik and John 2000).  Specific 
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investments between channel members can bring forth concerns about obsolete 
investments and inflexibility within the buyer-supplier relationship (Buvik and Andersen, 
2002; Buvik and John, 2000).  This asset specificity can lead to power asymmetry 
between channel members (Bucklin and Sengupta, 1993; Harvey and Speier, 2000).  
Finally, dependence of manufacturers on suppliers creates uncertainty and can result in 
high transaction costs (Bucklin and Sengupta, 1993; Lusch and Brown, 1996). 
Empirical evidence has suggests implementation of channel integration, or inter-
firm cooperation can reduce transaction costs.  If we take manufacturing industries as the 
focal position, on the upstream supply chain side, marketing scholars have found that 
firms will carry out more vertical coordination and joint action in the presence of 
relationship-specific investments (Buvik and John 2000; Joshi and Stump, 1999).  
Channel members are more likely to conduct strategic integrative arrangements with 
suppliers if they face uncertainty from dependence on these suppliers (Johnson, 1999).  
Cooperation and relational contracting between manufacturers with upstream firms can 
reduce possession and acquisition costs (Dahlstrom and Nygaard, 1999; Noordewier, 
John and Nevin, 1990).  Likewise, on the downstream side, interdependency and relation 
specific investments, and opportunism incurred in the supply chains, can lead to 
integrative organizational arrangements between manufacturers and retailers (Kim, 
2001).  Vertical contractual structures can be an effective resort to safeguard the 
downstream channel members from bargaining power and power imbalance incurred by 
the channel relationships (Dwyer and Oh, 1988; Frazier, 1999; Harvey and Speier, 2000). 
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Industrial Economics Literature 
Most industrial economics research examining the modularity phenomenon views 
organizational modularity as a disintegrated structure, and the coordination mechanisms 
of modular organizations are substitutes for traditional, vertically integrated firms 
(Sturgeon, 2002; Tsang, 2003).  Industrial analysts have shown that various industries, 
such as semiconductor (Machor, Mowery and Simcoe, 2002), electronics (Sturgeon, 
2002), among others, have experienced vertical disintegration under the influences of 
factors such as technology, economies of scale, innovative design, product life cycle, 
entrepreneurial moves, etc., in the latest two decades (Brusoni and Prencipe, 2001; 
Christensen, Verlinden and Westerman, 2002; Cox, Mowatt and Prevezer, 2002; Galvin 
and Morkel, 2001; Hemmert, 1999; Kenney and Von Burg, 1999; Macher, Mowery and 
Simcoe, 2002; Sturgeon, 2002). 
Industrial economics researchers suggest that the practices of modular production 
networks can lead to more disaggregated industrial landscapes (Langlois and Robertson, 
1995).  Modular organizations can facilitate crucial managerial variables, such as 
entrepreneurship (Kenney and Von Burg, 1999), vertical division of labor (Hemmert, 
1999), knowledge development (Brusoni and Prencipe, 2001), and technology 
deployment (Christensen, Verlinden and Westerman, 2002).  Through boundary-
spanning arrangements with other supply chain members, firms can specialize in core 
competences and access the resources of other firms to reach synergies (Langlois and 
Robertson, 1995; Richardson, 1972; Sturgeon, 2002; Tsang, 2003). 
Complementary literature in industrial economics has examined the transition 
from using simple market exchange mechanisms to more cooperative coordination 
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because of concerns with respect to transaction costs when using market mechanisms.  
Market mechanisms may not be able to resolve many issues of inter-firm exchanges, and 
market frictions are likely to occur and increase transaction costs (Williamson, 1975).  
Uncertainty from the external business environments can increase the cost of contracting 
between supply chain partners (Saussier, 2000).  Relation specific investment can result 
in ex ante transaction costs of negotiation, and ex post costs of obsolete assets (Artz and 
Brush, 2000).  Opportunistic behaviors, such as taking advantage of supply chain 
partners’ investments, may cause huge losses to these partners (Oxley, 1997). 
Industrial economics literature points out that firms should devise cooperative 
organizational forms, rather than market mechanisms, to safeguard inter-firm 
relationships and minimize transaction costs, since market mechanisms provide few 
protections to safeguard transaction hazards (Shelanski and Klein, 1995; Williamson, 
1975, 1995).  For example, longer contracts (Joskow, 1987; Lyons, 1996) and 
hierarchical structures (Oxley, 1997, 1999) can protect high asset specificity. More 
administrative control of the buyer-supplier relationships has been found to reduce the 
effect of uncertainty (Argyres, 1995).  In brief, firms tend to use more hierarchical 
control to govern the inter-firm relationship to minimize transaction costs (Ulset, 1996). 
In contrast, an alternative view suggest that, in general, firm groups in a 
concentrated industry may use market mechanisms to exert nontrivial influence when 
conducting supply chain transactions or coordinating supply chain operations (Cool and 
Henderson, 1998; Porter, 1980; Waldman and Jensen, 1998).  The actions employed by 
the concentrated industry may shape the structure of not only the focal industry but the 
interfaces between up- and down-stream industries.  Specifically, a focal industry with 
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high concentration may possess great bargaining power than do buyers and suppliers, and 
thus can take advantages of competitive pricing when coordinating its supply and 
demand.  Examples can be found in the development of the automobile and computer 
industries (Langlois and Robertson, 1995; Porter, 1980).  Moreover, a concentrated 
supplier industry is typically more able to implement supply chain transactions through 
monopolistic pricing mechanisms rather than longer term contracting.  Likewise, because 
of its better position on information, demand, and pricing, a concentrated customer 
industry may be capable to initiate price competition rather than build longer 
commitment with suppliers.  A prominent example is the retail industry.  Emerging 
powerful retailers can use competitive pricing against manufacturing industries to 
coordinate supply and demand (Porter, 1980). 
Empirical research streams have identified industry-level structural factors can be 
the driving forces of the firm boundaries.  Two studies suggest that the levels of minimal 
efficient production scale can affect the degree of vertical integration (Balakrishnan and 
Wernerfelt, 1986; Levy, 1985).  Moreover, the levels of concentration of upstream and 
downstream industries can affect the degree of vertical integration of the focal industry 
(MacDonald, 1985; Porter, 1980). 
Summary 
The review of relevant modularity research has indicated that organizational 
modularity has intersected with various research fields and the concept of modular 
organizations has been applied in many industries.  Most of the work agrees that 
organizational modularity can be an alternative to vertical integration.  Modularity 
researchers suggest organizational modularity is an emerging phenomenon that can 
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transform the extant industrial systems into more disintegrated ones.  Modularity research 
also indicates that modular organizational forms can change the configurations of supply 
chains. 
Researchers have analyzed organizational modularity from the TCE lens 
(Langlois and Robertson; 1995; Langlois; 1999, 2002; Sanchez, 1997, 1999; Sturgeon, 
2002).  On the one hand, this suggests TCE is very relevant for modularity research and 
has explanatory power for modularity research.  On the other hand, interestingly, our 
literature review indicates no modularity work that views organizational modularity as an 
alternative to not only vertical integration but also market mechanisms. 
Moreover, despite the abundant academic discussions and evidences on the 
increasing number of modular organizations, empirical studies that explicitly investigate 
organizational modularity at the industry level are few in numbers (Daft and Lewin, 
1993; Schilling and Steensma, 2001).  Few modularity works address which economic 
determinants corporations should be aware of as indicators whether to adopt 
organizational modularity (Daft and Lewin, 1993).  In addition, modularity researchers 
have not incorporated theoretical notions of organizational modularity, supply chains, and 
TCE, simultaneously into their empirical analysis.  
The preceding observations motivate this dissertation to conduct an industry-level 
investigation as to the drivers of organizational modularity by incorporating the 
constructs in organizational modularity, supply chain, and TCE research.  Researchers 
have conducted industry-level studies to analyze the relationship between governance 
structures and their economic drivers (Balakrishnan and Wernerfelt, 1986; Levy, 1985; 
MacDonald; 1985; D’Aveni and Ravenscraft, 1994; Porter; 1980; Ravenscraft, 1983; 
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Schilling and Steensma, 2001).  In the spirit of this stream of literature, we expect the 
industry level analysis can contribute to the knowledge of industrial organizational 
modularity. 
Our review of modularity literature, and complementary research concerning 
inter-firm governance structures, suggests several factors that drive industries to use 
organizational modularity as an alternative to market mechanism.  First, industrial 
economics studies have indicated that scale economies and industry concentration can 
drive an industry to be more vertically integrated (Balakrishnan and Wernerfelt, 1986; 
Levy, 1985; MacDonald, 1985; Porter, 1980).  In addition, strategic management 
literature has found that combined input and demand heterogeneity has a significant 
impact on an industry’s organizational modularity, although there is no information about 
the distinct impacts of the two factors (Schilling and Steensma, 2001).  Moreover, supply 
chain management suggests that the length of distribution channels to the ultimate 
customer markets can cause great uncertainty and drive firms to use boundary-spanning 
arrangements to safeguard uncertainty (Lee, Padmanabhan, and Whang, 1997; Chopra 
and Meindl, 2001). 
The next chapter will provide the theoretical explanations for the linkages 
between organizational modularity and its driving forces. Testable hypotheses will be 
formally developed. 
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CHAPER 3 THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
The objective of this dissertation is to investigate the drivers of a manufacturing 
industry’s organizational modularity.  The unit of analysis is a manufacturing industry 
(U.S. Census Bureau, 1997, 2004a; Waldman and Jensen, 1998).  Transaction Costs 
Economics (TCE) serves as the overarching theory to develop testable hypotheses.  This 
dissertation also incorporates TCE and supply chain management (SCM) perspectives to 
address our research questions. 
This chapter begins with a discussion of the relationships between TCE and 
organizational modularity.  We then theorize that organizational modularity and its major 
dimensions; that is, contract manufacturing, alliance formation, and alternative 
employment arrangement (Hitt, Keats, and DeMarie, 1998; Schilling and Steensma, 
2001; Ketchen and Hult, 2002; Tu et al., 2004), are consistent with TCE’s hybrid 
governance structure.  A firm thus can choose among vertical integration, market 
mechanisms, and modularity, to organize inter-firm relationships.  The focus of this 
dissertation is to investigate the governance decision between market mechanisms and 
organizational modularity, while keeping vertical integration constant.  We present a 
conceptual model of economic drivers of organizational modularity followed by the 
development of testable hypotheses. 
Transaction Cost Economics and Organizational Modularity 
The investigation concerning the dynamics of the current innovative modular 
organizational forms should reflect the transaction costs involved (Garud, 
Kumaraswamy, and Langlois, 2003, p. 7).  Modularity scholars have applied 
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management theories, such as Resource-Based View (Schilling and Steensma, 2001), 
capability-based view (Langlois and Robertson, 1995), and Schumpeter’s (1942) Creative 
Destruction (Sanchez and Mahoney, 1996) to analyze organizational modularity.  We 
contend that the TCE perspective can contribute to knowledge about the organizational 
modularity phenomenon. 
TCE is a theory used to study complex economic organization issues 
(Williamson, 1991a, 1991b, 1995).  TCE asserts that each transaction displays distinct 
dimensions; i.e. uncertainty, asset specificity, frequency and complexity, which can affect 
the costs of carrying out the transaction.  Furthermore, manager rationality is bounded 
with regard to uncertainty, and transactors of business exchanges, e.g. supply chain 
suppliers and buyers, are subject to hazards such as opportunism of parties involved in 
transactions.  As a result, there can be conflicts or tensions when firms attempt to conduct 
transactions.  These hazards can bring forth transaction costs - specifically, transaction 
costs ex ante, such as search costs, bargaining costs, contracting costs, and transaction 
costs ex post, such as maladaption and misalignment (Boerner and Macher, 2002; Klein, 
Crawford and Alchian, 1978; Williamson, 1975, 1985, 1995).  TCE scholars propose that 
each transaction should be carefully safeguarded with proper governance structure, so 
that the cost of the transaction can be minimized, if not eliminated, and the allocation of 
resources can be facilitated through the deliberately designed mechanism (Coase, 1937, 
1988; Williamson, 1985, 1995). 
TCE literature indicates that market, hybrid, and hierarchy are three generic 
governance modes of inter-organizational relationships (Shelanski and Klein, 1995; 
Williamson, 1995).  These three generic governance structures demonstrate different 
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competences, such as coordination, and information processing mechanisms, to manage 
different transactions.  Of the three, spot market and hierarchy are at the opposite ends of 
a spectrum.  Hierarchy is defined as a “fully integrated firm, where trading parties are 
under unified ownership and control” (Shelanski and Klein, 1995, p. 337), while spot 
market refers to the mechanism that governs simple transactions between demand and 
supply through prices in the marketplace (Grover and Malhotra, 2003, p. 460; Shelanski 
and Klein, 1995, p. 337; Williamson, 1975).  However, given the complexity of the 
organizations, governance structures cannot be fully analyzed with the make-or-buy 
dichotomy (Fine, 1998; Penrose, 1959; Powell, 1987; Richardson, 1972).  There exist a 
great number of intermediate formats to organize the economic systems, such as long-
term contracting, cooperation, alliance, or networks (Garud, Kumaraswamy, and 
Langlois, 2003; Tu et al., 2004; Van Hoek and Weken, 1998; Williamson, 1995) that 
exist between the spot market and hierarchy extremes. 
Scholars of TCE have indicated that there are various “hybrid” governance 
structures, which are located in the spectrum between the two extremes of spot market 
and hierarchy governance structures (Boerner and Macher, 2002, p. 5; Shelanski and 
Klein, 1995, p. 337; Williansom, 1995).  Examples of hybrid modes include licensing 
agreements, long-term supply contracts and R&D contracts (Oxley, 1999), alliances and 
joint ventures (Frazier, 1999; Oxley, 1999; Shelanski and Klein, 1995), relational 
contracting (Joskow, 1987; Palay, 1984), and bilateral organizational arrangements 
(Heide and John, 1990; Oxley, 1999). 
In the next two sub-sections, we contend that the dimensions of modularity; that 
is, contract manufacturing, alliance formation, and alternative employment (Hitt, Keats, 
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and DeMarie, 1998; Schilling and Steensma, 2001; Sturgeon, 2002) are consistent with 
TCE’s hybrid governance structure. 
Contract Manufacturing and Alliances as the Hybrid Alternative to Market 
Mechanism 
The first two dimensions of organizational modularity; i.e. contract manufacturing 
and alliances, are defined, respectively, as follows:  Contract manufacturing refers to the 
contractual relationships a firm in the focal industry establishes with external 
manufacturing establishments, which not only can supply raw materials but can also 
involve the production processes and subassemblies (U.S. Census Bureau, 1997; 
Sturgeon, 2002).  Alliances are voluntary contractual arrangements between separate 
firms involving the exchange, sharing, or joint development of products, technologies, or 
services, with each firm in an alliance having only limited control over the contract 
(Gomes-Casseres, 1996; Gulati, 1998).  Examples of alliances in the manufacturing 
industries include decision making programs, jointly owned ventures, licensing 
agreements, R&D projects, marketing plans, investment programs, etc., most of which 
are carried out jointly by participants (Gomes-Casseres, 1996). 
Contract manufacturing and alliances provide integrative organizational means to 
manage inter-firm exchange relationships and allocate production resources (Coase, 
1937; Richardson, 1972; Willianson, 1991b).  Market mechanisms may not work well, 
nor protect supply chain members from transaction hazards, when there are conditions in 
the marketplace such as changing demands, market heterogeneity, imperfect market 
information, power asymmetry, technology development, and so forth (Waldman and 
Jensen, 1998; Williamson, 1975).  As TCE scholars suggest, when simple market 
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mechanisms do not function properly, farsighted entrepreneurs should be able to apply 
hierarchical contracting arrangements, rather than market mechanisms, to minimize 
transaction costs and optimize values (Coase, 1937, 1998; Williamson, 1995).  Since both 
contract manufacturing and alliances are more hierarchical and integrative than market 
mechanisms, we consider that these two dimensions are consistent with the hybrid mode 
of governance.  Below we present spectrums of inter-firm governance structures (Figure 
3.1 and Figure 3.2) to show how these two dimensions of organizational modularity can 
be located on a spot market, hybrid, hierarchy spectrum. 
Next, we will show that the third major dimension of organizational modularity, 
alternative employment arrangements, is also consistent with the hybrid governance 
structure, and hence that, overall, organizational modularity belongs to the hybrid 
governance category (Powell, 1987; Williamson, 1991b; Zenger and Hesterly, 1997). 
Alternative Employment Arrangement as a Hybrid Labor Governance Structure 
The labor market should be considered as a crucial supplier to an industry (Porter, 
1980).  In addition to acquiring labor from the spot market on employing labor directly, 
current business practices have adopted alternative employment arrangements 
(Houseman, 1999; Schilling and Steensma, 2001).  These alternative employment 
arrangements include agency temporaries and contract laborers.  The following 
discussion provides short summaries of the generic modes of hierarchy, spot-market and 
hybrid governance structures in labor organization.  The subsequent section proposes an 
alternative employment dimension of organizational modularity that belongs to the 
hybrid mode of labor organization. 
 33
FIGURE 3.1 
CONTRACT MANUFACTURING AS A HYBRID GOVERNANCE MODE 













Hierarchy Mode of Labor Management 
The hierarchy mode of labor organization uses internal administrative means to 
govern the pricing and allocation of employment in a firm (Doeringer and Piore, 1971, 
pp. 1-2).  Typically, workers who are considered as a hierarchy’s human assets are 
specialized to the firm’s use, and training provided for hierarchy workers is “on-the-job 
and firm-specific” (Osterman, 1982, p. 350; Williamson, 1985, p. 78).  Workers in the 
hierarchy category include corporate officers and regular full-time employees (U.S. 
Census Bureau, 1997; Houseman, 1999). 
Spot-Market Mode of Labor Management 
Literature on labor management indicates two categories of labor spot markets.  
In the first category, firms acquire manpower directly from a pool of local labor.  For 
manufacturing firms, these workers can perform a variety of tasks albeit with generally 
poorer performance as compared to regular employees (Stratman, Roth, and Gilland, 
2004).  Williamson (1985) calls the other category “internal spot market”.  In practice, 
the internal spot market consists of three kinds of workers - on-call workers, day laborers, 
and direct-hire temporaries (Houseman, 1999).  These workers are hired on an as needed 
basis and generally perform specific projects.  Their hours of work typically vary from 
period to period, and their assignments are oftentimes based on a short-term basis 
(Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1997; Houseman, 1999).  Their assignments are routine, 
nonspecific and separable, such as data entry, warehousing, inspection procedures for 
production, etc. (Stratman, Roth, and Gilland, 2004; Williamson, 1985). 
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Workers in the spot market can move between employers without losing 
productivity since they typically perform standard assignments.  For manufacturing firms, 
maintaining an employment relationship with these workers is of minimal importance.  
Also, firms can replace this labor without spending set-up costs.  Contracting can be 
occasional and recurrent between labor providers and buyers, but employment can be 
terminated if either party is dissatisfied (Williamson, 1985, pp. 73-74 and 245). 
Hybrid Mode of Labor Management 
Researchers and government analysts of labor management have identified the 
rise in practices of alternative employment arrangements, such as agency temporaries, 
leased workers, independent self-employed contractors, contract companies, and others, 
that could transform the traditional labor organization concept (Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, 1997; Camuffo, 2002; Davis-Blake and Uzzi, 1993; Houseman, 1999; Kunda, 
Barley and Evans, 2002; Osterman, 1994, 1999; Osterman, Kochan, Locke and Piore, 
2001).  Agency temporaries are employees of a staffing firm (i.e. a temporary agency) 
that places these employees with a client firm on a short-term basis. The client firms 
usually direct the work of agency temporaries.  Leased employees are also employees of 
a staffing temporary agency with longer-term contracts.  Contract company workers are 
employees hired by a contract company.  Independent contractors are self-employed and 
direct their own work when performing their roles, and include independent consultants 
and free-lance workers (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1997; Houseman, 1999).  Agency 
temporaries, leased employees, contract company workers, and independent contractors 
are more integrative into an organization’s hierarchy than are workers hired on the spot 
labor market. 
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We provide a spectrum (Figure 3.3) of spot market, hybrid, and hierarchy with 
regard to labor management, according to TCE’s generic modes of governance structures.  
The spectrum of the governance structures of labor markets are anchored by the left 
extreme point, market governance, and right extreme point, hierarchy governance.  The 
agency temporaries, contract company workers and independent contractors, are located 
in the middle ground of this continuum.  We thus deem these two groups of employments 
as hybrid modes.  In our data collection, we sum up the number of the foregoing hybrid 
employment workers while exclude “spot market” workers to arrive at an overall 
alternative employment count.  This conceptualization is consistent with Schilling and 
Steensma’s (2001) “alternative work arrangements” dimension of organizational 
modularity. 
Organizational Modularity as a Hybrid Governance Structure 
Based on the preceding discussion, since the three dimensions of organizational 
modularity (contract manufacturing, alliances, and alternative employment arrangements) 
do not fit the two extremes of the conventional market-or-hierarchy options (or make-or-
buy dichotomy) and display attributes of the hybrid governance mode, we thus contend 
that organizational modularity is consistent with TCE’s hybrid governance structure 
(Hitt, Keats, and Demarie, 1998; Ketchen and Hult, 2002; Langlois and Robertson, 1995; 
Mohoney, 1992; Sturgeon, 2002; Schilling and Steensma, 2001; Williamson, 1985, 
1991b, 1995).  In comparison to vertical integration’s internal operations and market 
governance’s coordination through price mechanisms, organizational modularity uses 
various short-term or long-term contractual governances to organize inter-firm activities.  
These intermediate governances display attributes that are similar to both vertical  
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FIGURE 3.3 
ALTERNATIVE EMPLOYMENT AS A HYBRID GOVERNANCE MODE 
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integration and market mechanisms.  Also, modular organizations show attributes of the 
hybrid mode, such as the autonomy of system components, and the interconnections 
between the parts of a system (Schilling, 2000; Schilling and Steensma, 2001; 
Williamson, 1991b).  In sum, the following figure (Figure 3.4) shows that overall 
organizational modularity can be located on the middle ground of the spot market, 
hybrid, hierarchy spectrum. 
Overview of the Model and Definitions of Variables 
We propose that the organizational modularity of the focal industry is a function 
of attributes of upstream and downstream supply chains and attributes of the focal 
industry.  Figure 3.5 presents a conceptual model with relevant variables. 
Organizational modularity was defined in chapter one.  Industry level 
heterogeneity is defined as the diversity of focal industries with regards to input and 
demand (Allenby and Rossi, 1999, p. 57-58; Joglekar and Hamburg, 1989, p. 215; 
Schilling and Steensma, 2001).  Diversity can be displayed through attributes of 
industries adjacent to the focal industry, such as transaction amounts, physical assets, 
strategic resources, competitive strengths, concentration level, profitability, etc. (Allenby 
and Rossi, 1999, p. 57-58; Joglekar and Hamburg, 1989, p. 215).  Measures used in our 
model also include economies of scale and industry concentration.  Porter (1980, p.7) 
defines economies of scale as the “declines in unit costs of a product (or operation or 
function that goes into producing a product) as the absolute volume per period increases.” 
Industry concentration refers to the market shared by large companies in an individual 
industry (Porter, 1980; Waldman and Jensen, 1998).  Industry concentration indicates the 
role large companies play inside an individual industry (Waldman and Jensen, 1998). 
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FIGURE 3.4 
ORGANIZATIONAL MODULARITY AS A HYBRID GOVERNANCE MODE 
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FIGURE 3.5  
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We use the overall heterogeneity measures for input and demand heterogeneity 
variables, while investigating the scale economies and concentration variables of primary 
upstream and downstream industries in the supply chain.  A primary supply chain is 
linked by industries associated with physical flow of a main product category, from raw 
materials to industrial customers or consumer markets.  Industries in primary supply 
chains have the highest annual exchange volumes with each other, compared to other 
transacting industries (Bozarth, Handfield, and Das 1998).  We use the primary supply 
chain, instead of the entire number of possible supply chain configurations, for 
parsimonious reason (Barwise, 1995) since there can be numerous, if not countless, 
possibilities of supply chain structures considering all potential combinations of suppliers 
and customers of a focal industry (Chopra and Meindl, 2001; Christopher, 1998). 
There are two issues our conceptual model does not attempt to address in this 
dissertation.  First, as mentioned in chapter one, we do not measure industry level 
transaction costs directly, although we do examine the impacts of economic variables that 
can generate significant concerns of transaction costs.  In addition, we do not attempt to 
predict which supply chain member will take initiatives to implement modularity.  Our 
investigation concentrates on the governance choices that measure the degree of 
hierarchical arrangements as opposed to market mechanisms. 
Fundamental Assumptions 
The main interest of this dissertation is how the explanatory variables can 
potentially raise transaction costs, and how transaction costs can affect the degree of 
industrial organizational modularity.  Economic factors will have impacts on the 
transaction costs, as well as the production costs, of firms in the supply chains.  And 
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these costs will influence decisions in organizing inter-firm governance.  As TCE 
scholars have suggested, farsighted entrepreneurs should be able to adopt proper 
contracting mechanisms to overcome potential hazards, and operate their business 
efficiently and effectively (Coase, 1937, 1998; Williamson, 1995, 1999).  We therefore 
assume that managerial goals are to minimize their total costs, including transaction costs 
and production costs.  We believe that firm behaviors will be directed by these 
optimization rules (Williamson, 1991b). 
In the following sections, we will specify our hypotheses and explain the 
relationships between variables in our model. 
Heterogeneity and Organizational Modularity 
Heterogeneous input and demand markets in the supply chain raise concern 
regarding transaction costs (Waldman and Jensen, 1998).  Transaction costs in 
homogeneous markets in the supply chain differ from heterogeneous markets in several 
aspects.  On the input side, if the focal industry has homogeneous suppliers, standard 
market price systems will function at an optimal level.  Changes in the fluctuation of 
input quantity, price, or quality, can be resolved with simple adjustments in purchasing 
arrangements (Porter, 1980). Switching of inputs or suppliers can be done relatively 
easily through market mechanisms. Moreover, on the demand side, if firms are serving 
homogeneous markets, using standard inputs to produce generic products and services 
can meet various market demands.  In the presence of demand homogeneity, changes in 
marketing channels or locations can be easily accomplished with little switching cost.  
Exchanges between supply chain partners display a low degree of complexity, 
uncertainty, and specificity in the presence of input homogeneity (David and Han, 2004; 
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Williamson, 1975, 1985).  However, higher degrees of input and demand heterogeneity 
can create transaction conditions very different from homogeneous input and demand 
markets, by which market mechanisms cannot prevent supply chain partners from 
increasing transaction costs. 
From the viewpoint of the focal industry, input and demand heterogeneity can 
lead to complexity of supply chain functions, such as purchasing and distribution.  
Purchasing heterogeneous inputs through the marketplace may indicate complex 
procurement processes from a variety of upstream industries (Buvik and Andersen, 2002; 
Buvik and John, 2000; Ulset 1996).  Furthermore, heterogeneity on the demand side 
could mean greater complexity in processing market demands for various customers and 
distribution channels.  Using market mechanisms to coordinate supply chain functions 
may not be the optimal means for firms in the focal industries with heterogeneous input 
or demand markets, because these firms may not be able to secure necessary production 
inputs or distribution channels from the marketplace.  Firms in the focal industries may 
thus incur higher transaction costs, in terms of searching, negotiation, and monitoring 
efforts, to coordinating greater numbers of supply chain partners on either the upstream 
or downstream sides (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1985). 
Furthermore, heterogeneity from the input and demand sides of the supply chain 
can create uncertain conditions for the focal industries.  As Allenby and Rossi (1999) 
have stated, “As consumer preferences and sensitivities become more diverse, it becomes 
less and less efficient to consider the market in the aggregate” (p. 57-58).  On the input 
side, variations in input supplies, qualities, services, prices, or combinations of preceding 
factors, can cause supply chain inefficiencies, such as raw materials stockpiles, input 
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stockouts, disruptions of production, and others (Chopra and Meindl, 2001; Pine II, 
1993).  In addition, technology advances from the upstream supply chain, such as R&D 
breakthroughs, can result in greater impacts on supplies and can bring forth new 
production arrangements or even new configurations of the supply chain (Fine, 1998).  
On the demand side, demand heterogeneity creates uncertainty resulting from changes in 
customer preferences, order quantities, prices, service levels, etc., of different distribution 
channels (Artz and Brush, 2000; Dahlstrom and Nygaard 1999; Saussier, 2000; 
Wernerfelt and Karnani, 1987).  Since focal firms may not be able to obtain sufficient 
information to make optimal predictions to meet needs for the heterogeneous markets, 
this uncertainty might not be predicted and responded to easily (Williamson, 1975, 1985).  
The uncertainty of heterogeneous inputs and demands can be even higher if competitors 
foreclose suppliers or distribution channels from upstream or downstream industries 
(Boerner and Macher, 2002; Shelanski and Klein, 1995; Williamson, 1975).  These 
hazards can translate into transaction costs for firms in the focal industry. 
Higher heterogeneity from upstream and downstream supply chains can also 
result in more relation-specific arrangements, either tangible or intangible, between 
supply chain partners (Shelanski and Klein, 1995).  On the input side, heterogeneous 
inputs can result in more specialized arrangements with different suppliers, such as 
specialized negotiations and greater efforts to conduct transactions (Artz and Brush, 
2000).  Likewise, on the demand side, heterogeneity displayed by downstream markets 
such as diverse channels of distribution, different and shifting customer preferences, 
demand quantity variance, prices, service provision requirements (e.g. customer service 
levels, lead times), geographical dispersion, among others, can generate pressure for 
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firms in the focal industry to customize production or logistics arrangements 
(Christopher, 1998; Lee, Padmanabhan and Whang, 1997).  Focal firm customization of 
products, services, or distribution channels, for various downstream supply chain 
partners, can lead to greater transaction costs, as well as high production and logistics 
costs (Buvik and Andersen, 2002; Buvik and John, 2000; Coase, 1937; Dyer, 1996; 
Houston and Johnson, 2000; Kotha, 1995; Pine, 1993; Porter, 1985; Ulset, 1996).  
Aggregate switching costs can also increase if inputs or distribution channels cannot be 
altered or rearranged easily (Heide and John, 1990; Houston and Johnson, 2000; 
Monteverde and Teece, 1982; Willianson, 1975, 1985).  When specific investments can 
no longer generate desirable outcomes, using market mechanisms without safeguards can 
cause higher costs of obsolescences (Williamson, 1975).  Furthermore, although the use 
of technology and standards can facilitate the progress of the external links (Bettis and 
Hitt, 1995; Angeres, 1999; Zenger and Hesterly, 1997; Sturgeon, 2002), the additional 
investments can create higher specificity, resulting in the need for proper organizational 
devices as safeguards. 
As compared to market mechanism that has limited safeguards for business 
exchanges, modular organizations adopt more hierarchical practices, such as longer-term 
contracting and interdependent governance structures, to safeguard the uncertainty 
hazards from heterogeneity, reduce transaction costs, and facilitate inter-firm 
coordination (Bucklin and Sengupta, 1993; Harvey and Speier 2000).  Cooperative and 
adaptive arrangements, e.g. longer-term relational contract, joint ventures, and alliances 
with supply chain partners, have been identified as integrative means to enhance 
coordination between sequential functions in the supply chain in order to cope with 
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uncertainty (Buvik and Anderson, 2002; Coase, 1937; Gulati and Singh, 1998; Langlois 
and Robertson, 1995; Palay, 1984; Nambisan, 2002; Noordewier, John and Nevin, 1990; 
Shelanski and Klein, 1995; Stern and Reve, 1980).  In brief, by building collaborative 
relationship with other supply chain partners, firms in the focal industry can use 
modularity to safeguard against hazards and to provide complementary strategic 
resources from business partners, thus reducing uncertainty (Coase, 1937; Noordewier, 
John and Nevin, 1990; Williamson, 1975). 
In addition, uncertainty associated with demand heterogeneity can force firms to 
build up cooperative organizational arrangements with not only downstream channels but 
also upstream partners. Uncertainty displayed in demand heterogeneity will prompt firms 
to reconfigure their existing resources by expanding their production system boundaries 
through contract manufacturing (Schilling, 2000; Schilling and Steensma, 2001).  Finally, 
through vertical coordination, modular organizations can safeguard the relation-specific 
investment as well as pertinent inter-firm relationships between supply chain partners 
facing special service level (Buvik and John, 2000, Joskow, 1987; Kim, 2001; Lyons, 
1996; Oxley, 1999). 
Literature has provided evidence that the integrative structure of modular 
organizations can save nontrivial transaction costs.  On the input side, Noordewier, John, 
and Nevin (1990) have found that relational contracting can reduce purchasing costs.  On 
the demand side, coordination between firms and downstream supply chain members can 
reduce transaction costs after integrative inter-firm relationships are established (Buvik 
and Andersen, 2002; Buvik and John, 2000; Williamson, 1985). 
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Cooperative and adaptive arrangements, e.g. vendor-management inventory 
systems, quick response system, JIT production, and joint logistics and marketing (Joshi 
and Stump, 1999), have been implemented by supply chain members to coordinate their 
processes (Christopher, 1998).  Also, several corporations provide successful practices of 
organizational modularity.  For instance, the B-2 bomber project (Argyres, 1999), Sun 
Microsystem’s joint R&D programs  (Garud and Kumaraswamy, 1995), and Toyata’s 
supplier network (Dyer and Nobeoka, 2000), provide illustrations that firms can establish 
modular organizations with supply chain members to minimize transaction costs and 
create flexibility.  In addition, IBM and Dell use a variety of cooperative suppliers to 
support their complex production and assembly systems (Baldwin and Clark, 1997; Pine, 
1993; Schilling and Steensma, 2001).  Facing fast changing competition, Johnson & 
Johnson decided to use more collaborative arrangements to link itself with many small, 
autonomous companies, when it recognized an increase in its market turbulence (Pine, 
1993, p. 237).  These arrangements have shown that organizational modularity can 
enhance supply chain coordination and reduce transaction costs (Langlois and Robertson, 
1995). 
In sum, in comparison to market mechanisms, organizational modularity is a more 
hierarchical organizational arrangement that can reduce transaction costs caused by input 
and demand heterogeneity, and facilitate the coordination of supply chain processes given 
heterogeneous input and demand conditions.  This is consistent with the TCE literature 
that longer-term contracting and hierarchical governance structures have been used to 
safeguard firms against transaction hazards (Joshi and Stump 1999; Joskow 1987; Lyons 
1996; Oxley, 1999; Ulset 1996).  Thus, we propose the following hypotheses: 
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Hypothesis 1a: Other things being equal, the greater the input heterogeneity, the 
greater the level of the focal industry’s organizational modularity. 
Hypothesis 1b: Other things being equal, the greater the demand heterogeneity, the 
greater the level of the focal industry’s organizational modularity. 
Organizational Modularity and the Length of Industrial Distribution Channel to the 
Final Market in the Primary Industrial Supply Chain 
Industries at different echelon of supply chains face different levels of 
uncertainties resulting from changing order quantities, cycle times, geographically 
sporadic markets, insufficient information gathered from the marketplace, different 
distribution channels, etc. (Achrol, 1997; Chopra and Meindl, 2001).  These uncertainties 
can be amplified for upstream industries, i.e. the “Bullwhip” effect (Fine, 1998; Lee, 
Padmanabhan, and Whang, 1997).  Industries at upstream supply chain may incur higher 
costs to buffer these variations.  More specifically, a longer industrial distribution channel 
of a focal industry may lead to greater bullwhip effect that can translate to higher 
transaction costs on purchasing and marketing. 
Supply chain members incur some limitations when coping with bullwhip effects.  
First, being upstream in a supply chain may limit firms from receiving sufficient 
information about the marketplace.  Moreover, management is subject to bounded 
rationality, and firms are not able to completely predict market attributes and the future 
change (Chopra and Meindl, 2001; Fine, 1998).  Lack of coordination, high product 
variation, and moves to counter the bullwhip effects by other firms in the supply chain, 
may further weaken abilities to align supply chain operations to meet real market demand 
(Lee, Padmanabhan, and Whang, 1997).  As a result, the bullwhip effect may cause firms 
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to increase their production capacities or inventory levels to absorb the variations caused 
by uncertainties. 
Current SCM programs, such as VMI, QR/ECR, and EDI, have been adopted to 
reduce the demand amplification effects in distribution channels (Coyle, Bardi, and 
Langley, 1996; Langlois and Robertson, 1995; Lee, So and Tang, 2000; Lee, Clark, and 
Tam, 1999).  These information-sharing programs may enhance the integration of supply 
chain coordination; on the other hand, communication technology investment can 
increase asset specificity and interdependence (Buvik and Andersen, 2002; Buvik and 
John, 2000; Ulset, 1996).  Supply chain members thus should build proper governance 
structures to safeguard these inter-organizational investments (Mahoney, 1992; 
Williamson, 1985). 
In order to reduce the impacts of demand amplification in their distribution 
channels, manufacturers can adopt organizational modularity to facilitate supply chain 
coordination (Argyres, 995; Buvik and John, 2000; Fine, 1998, p. 94; Oxley, 1999; Ulset, 
1996).  Collaborative agreements between supply chain partners, such as strategic 
alliances and long-term contractual relationships, can reduce the distortion of market 
signals through information-sharing arrangements.  Richer information made available 
through coordination in modular structures can help firms to increase the accuracy of 
predication and avoid demand amplification effects (Chopra and Meindl, 2001; Fine, 
1998).  More integrative arrangements can also safeguard relation-specific investments, 
such as communication investments, inter-organizational information technology, and 
EDI, among others (Fine, 1998; Noordewier, John and Nevin, 1990; Palay, 1984;).  
Finally, tight inter-firm governance structure can enhance performance under uncertainty 
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in buyer-supplier relationships (Noordewier, John and Nevin (1990).  Therefore, we 
present the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: Other things being equal, the greater the focal industry’s length of 
distribution channel to the final customer markets in a primary supply chain, the 
greater the level of the focal industry’s organizational modularity.  
Scale Economies and Organizational Modularity 
Scale Economies of the Focal Industry 
Industrial structures influenced by economies of scale have implications for 
contracting behaviors between supply chain partners (Porter, 1980; Schumpeter, 1942).  
Economies of scale are crucial determinant of firm boundaries and market structure 
(Waldman and Jensen, 1998; Williamson, 1991a).  Higher minimum efficient scales 
(MES) indicate manufacturers may be required to reach a larger production threshold to 
obtain the lowest possible unit cost.  If MES is large relative to market size, high 
economies of scale may favor a market structure in which only a relatively small numbers 
of firms can operate efficiently since they possess cost advantages over other firms 
(Porter, 1980; Waldman and Jensen, 1998).  Higher economies of scale of the focal 
industry not only can limit the growth of other firms in the same industry, but also can 
create barriers for firms trying to enter the industry (Waldman and Jensen, 1998).  The 
advantages of large scale firms can be greater when firms possess intangible resources to 
run the larger scale production systems (Porter, 1980).  Dependence of supply chain 
members on the fewer firms in the focal industry may thus develop. 
Accordingly, asset specificity may be significant between low-cost focal firms 
and supply chain partners because of unique characteristics to facilitate or effectuate the 
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collaboration (Williamson, 1975).  Firms on the upstream or downstream sides of the 
focal industry may attempt to establish integrative arrangements with the focal industry, 
such as contract manufacturing, to overcome entry barriers such as high investments for 
manufacturing systems.  Smaller firms adjacent to an industry with high economies of 
scale may find it difficult to reach the threshold of large MES for production in a short 
period of time (Langlois and Robertson, 1995; Sturgeon, 2002).  Switching costs can 
increase because of the link with large-scale and low-cost focal manufacturers 
(Monteverde and Teece 1982).  More specifically, sophisticated production systems in 
the focal industry, which have already reached a higher level of plant and equipment 
utilization, may motivate firms in the adjacent industries to specialize in particular value 
chain activities, yet leverage focal firms’ strength at the same time (Langlois and 
Robertson, 1995; Porter, 1980; Sturgeon, 2002).  In addition, economies of scale of 
particular production processes can generate clusters inside the focal industry (Baldwin 
and Clark, 2000).  These clusters may specialize in different stages of production, and 
connect with each other through integrative governance structures, such as firms do in the 
semiconductor industry (FSA, 2003; Baldwin and Clark, 2000; Langlois and Robertson, 
1995).  As a result, transaction costs in the form of asset specificity and switching costs 
may rise in the interfaces between focal firms and supply chain partners, and two-way 
safeguards could be taken to lesson the rising transaction costs. 
Greater economies of scale can also be achieved through forward or backward 
vertically integrative moves by firms in the focal industry with large supply chain 
partners.  Large firms with scale economies can maintain their specialized functions to 
reach efficiency, and build integrative links with efficient supply chain members.  Thus, 
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these firms can avoid investing in vertical integration, minimize search costs for low cost 
partners (market mechanisms), and increase system efficiency simultaneously (Joglekar 
and Hamburg, 1989; Porter, 1980; Schumpeter, 1942; Sturgeon, 2002).  Larger firms thus 
can build an integrated supply chain that is more efficient in the areas of transactions, 
production, and distribution, comparing to supply chains with different disconnected 
firms of various sizes (Porter, 1998).  Dell provides a good example of a firm able to 
leverage its supply chain partners’ scale economies better than its own supply chain. 
The preceding discussion is consistent with organizational modularity studies that 
demonstrated that firms specialized in particular supply chain functions have established 
external integrative relationships with their supply chain partners (Best, 1994; Langlois 
and Robertson, 1995, Gomes-Goncerres, 1996).  Thus, 
Hypothesis 3: Other things being equal, the greater the focal industry’s economies 
of scale, the greater the level of the focal industry’s organizational modularity. 
Scale Economies of the Upstream and Downstream Industries in the Primary Supply 
Chain 
Scale economies can be found in supply chain functions, such as production, 
assembly, logistics, marketing, and others (Porter, 1980).  From the perspective of the 
focal industry, scale economies displayed by suppliers or customers can provide cost 
advantages or superior expertise for these supply chain functions (Coase, 1937, 1988; 
Lyons, 1995, Porter, 1980).  These skills employed by supply chain partners may not be 
easily developed or possessed by focal firms.  By utilizing external strengths of efficient 
supply chain partners, firms in the focal industry may be able to specialize in their 
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particular supply chain function and help to optimize total supply chain operations at the 
same time (Langlois and Robertson, 1995; Sturgeon, 2002). 
Large, efficient supply chain partners may help firms in the focal industry to 
minimize costs and optimize values for the entire production and distribution system 
(Coase, 1937; Langlois and Robertson, 1995; Sturgeon, 2002).  On the other hand, by 
accessing business partners with high scale economies, the dependence of firms in the 
focal industries may rise, thus increasing potential transaction costs (Bozarth, Handfield, 
and Das 1998; Williamson, 1975, 1985).  Furthermore, because of the high MES 
requirement, focal firms generally lack the capability to overcome high barriers to 
backward and forward integration (Porter, 1980; Waldman and Jensen, 1998).  As a 
result, the existence of economies of scale in upstream and downstream firms may limit a 
focal firm’s options in governance structures.  The governance structure options can be 
even fewer if the firms in the focal industry are not just relatively smaller, but inefficient 
due to a lack of investment resources (Porter, 1980; Cool and Henderson, 1998). 
For firms in the focal industry, high scale economies of the primary upstream and 
downstream industries have profound implications for transaction costs and total supply 
chain management.  From the viewpoint of the focal industry, a primary upstream 
industry with large economies of scale is very different from a competitive supply 
market. Firms in the focal industry will tend to depend on a few suppliers with scale 
economies to gain greater efficiencies (Coase, 1937, 1988; Lyons, 1980, 1995, Porter, 
1980).  Furthermore, firms in the focal industry may transact with high purchasing 
volumes and cause even greater dependence on large-scale suppliers (Buvik and 
Andersen 2002; Buvik and John 2000).  The dependence on suppliers with scale 
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economies in the upstream supply chain can result in uncertainty and the need for greater 
contracting efforts to guard against transaction hazards (Artz and Brush 2000; Bucklin 
and Sengupta, 1993; Lusch and Brown, 1996; Saussier 2000). 
By the same token, in downstream industries with high scale economies, there 
may only be a small number of firms or channels of distribution available.  The limited 
options for focal firms may lead to increasing dependence (Williamson, 1975, 1985).  
Moreover, to obtain further advantages with regard to profitability or sales performance, 
firms may try to concentrate high transaction volumes with large supply chain partners,  
and thus generate greater dependence and potential hazards (e.g., a firm supplying Wal-
Mart) (Buvik and Andersen 2002; Buvik and John 2000).  In this context, switching costs 
may be high and result in high relation-specific commitment, i.e. asset specificity.  
Switching costs, together with the uncertainty incurred, may increase transaction costs 
accordingly (Artz and Brush, 2000; Monteverde and Teece 1982; Saussier, 2000). 
Further, specific investments and cooperation efforts may be required to facilitate 
coordination between the focal industry and large supply chain members in order to 
achieve a reduction in supply chain costs (Angeres, 1999, Langlois and Robertson, 1995; 
Sturgeon, 2002; Zenger and Hesterly, 1997).  Advanced inter-organizational information 
systems, such as computer-aided design (CAD), computer-aided manufacturing (CAM), 
flexible manufacturing systems (FMS), electronic data exchange (EDI), quick response 
(QR) systems, Efficient Customer Response (ECR) systems, and supply chain 
management (SCM) systems, have been developed to facilitate the coordination between 
firms in the focal industry and supply chain partners in order to reach synergistic 
cooperation (Malone, Yates, and Benjamin, 1987).  There can be joint actions following 
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investments between supply chain members (Joshi and Stump, 1999).  These technology 
investments and relationship specific arrangements can increase the asset specificity that 
can eventually lead to higher transaction costs and switching costs (Artz and Brush 2000; 
Bucklin and Sengupta 1993; Harvey and Speier 2000; Monteverde and Teece 1982; 
Saussier, 2000). 
As opposed to using price mechanisms without safeguard, cooperative 
arrangements, e.g. longer-term contracts, joint ventures, or alliances, can be established 
between firms in the focal industry and supply chain partners.  Inter-firm agreements 
arrangements, such as administrative control and joint actions, can be built between 
manufacturers and supply chain partners with superior manufacturing or distribution 
capacities, so that they can mitigate uncertainty in buyer-supplier relationships (Argyres, 
1995; Buvik and Anderson, 2002; Dahlstrom and Nygaard 1999; Dwyer and Oh, 1988; 
Gulati and Singh, 1998; Houston and Johnston, 2000; Johnson, 1999; Joshi and Strump, 
1999; Joskow, 1987; Lyons, 1996; Osborn and Baughn, 1990; Oxley, 1999; Ulset, 1996; 
Williamson, 1985).  In addition, supply chain coordination can also reduce transaction 
costs when firms face transaction uncertainties from supply chain partners (Buvik and 
John, 2000; Dyer, 1997). 
The effect of economies of scale from the downstream industry needs further 
discussion.  Large downstream supply chain partners may request firms in the focal 
industry to provide inputs with high volume and low costs, and thus put focal firms under 
efficiency pressure.  Firms in the focal industries may need to establish closer 
relationships with upstream supply chain partners to ensure low costs inputs and to steady 
and smooth flows toward large downstream channels (Noordewier, John and Nevin, 
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1990).  Therefore, adopting modularity by building inter-organizational ties with supply 
chain partners can reduce transaction hazards and safeguard uncertainty brought forth by 
dependence on large firms in supply chains. 
Literature has provided examples of integrative moves by manufacturers that 
coordinate with supply chain partners with high scale economies.  Ceramics and textiles 
industries in Italy, and industrial groups in Denmark and Germany, are examples of 
cooperative mechanisms between small firms and their suppliers with economies of scale 
(Best, 1990; Pine II, 1993; Langlois and Robertson, 1995).  The Silicon Valley in the 
U.S. is also a domestic illustration of the cooperation between large efficient firms (Pine 
II, 1993; Sturgeon, 2002). 
In brief, organizational modularity provides an alternative option for firms to 
minimize uncertainty (Williamson, 1975).  Cost-minimizing firms could consider using 
modular production networks as integrative and hierarchical governance structures not 
only to lower production costs, but also to minimize transaction costs in the supply chain.  
Our argument is consistent with TCE’s prediction that more hierarchical coordination 
mechanisms may be more effective in lowering transaction costs (Osborn and Baughn, 
1990) than market mechanisms (Williamson, 1985; 1991a).  Thus, we conclude the above 
discussion with the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 4a: Other things being equal, the greater the economies of scale of the 
primary upstream industry, the greater the level of the focal industry’s 
organizational modularity. 
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Hypothesis 4b: Other things being equal, the greater the economies of scale of the 
primary downstream industry, the greater the level of the focal industry’s 
organizational modularity. 
Concentration in an Industry’s Primary Supply Chain and Organizational 
Modularity 
Concentration of the Focal Industry 
High concentration can be found in oligopolistic and monopolistic industries that 
have several powerful firms.  Highly concentrated industries typically have a different 
competitive status from less concentrated industries.  Firms in concentrated industries 
may possess market powers, compared to smaller competitors and their supply chain 
partners (Porter, 1980).  Industries with powerful firms can prevent entry threats through 
vertical integration.  Powerful firms in highly concentrated industries can limit the 
number of competitors within and outside the focal industry (Waldman and Jensen, 
1998).  This small numbers bargaining characteristic between powerful firms and supply 
chain members may lead to greater opportunistic behaviors in the marketplace or 
transactions (Frazier, 1999; Williamson, 1975). 
Potential transaction costs may exist at the interfaces between a highly 
concentrated focal industry and supply and customer industries.  Firms in concentrated 
industries may try to reduce uncertainty in the marketplace through vertical integrative 
arrangements with their supply chain partners (Joglekar and Hamburg, 1989).  The 
potential to lower transaction costs can motivate large firms to exercise their bargaining 
power to establish integrative inter-firm links with supply chain partners (Porter, 1980).  
Firms in concentrated industries can extend their power through integrative moves to 
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control suppliers or customers (Porter, 1980; Waldman and Jensen, 1998).  These 
integrative arrangements can facilitate a powerful firm’s control over complementary 
resources, such as R&D, marketing channels, logistics capabilities, information 
technologies, etc. (Gulati, 1998; Joglekar and Hamburg, 1989; Porter, 1980; Schumpeter, 
1942). 
Additionally, firms in adjacent upstream and downstream sides of highly 
concentrated industries are likely to build hierarchical governance structures rather than 
to implement market mechanisms.  These coordinating arrangements can help suppliers 
and customers reduce the negative impacts due to significant bargaining power, such as 
opportunistic behaviors, from powerful firms, and can thus reduce costs of transacting 
with large firms in the concentrated industries (Williamson, 1975, 1985). 
In sum, based on the preceding discussion, we contend that firms in the focal 
industry with high concentration can build more integrative relationships with external 
firms, and thus increase organizational modularity of the focal industry.  We present our 
hypothesis as follows: 
Hypothesis 5: Other things being equal, the greater the concentration of the focal 
industry, the greater the level of the focal industry’s organizational modularity.  
Concentration of the Upstream and Downstream Industries in the Primary Supply Chain 
Conflicts are more likely when firms negotiate with powerful supply chain 
partners, such as large distributors in downstream distribution channels (Frazier and Rody 
1991; Geyskens, Steenkamp, and Kumar, 1999; Johnson, 1999), and these conflicts can 
lead to high transaction costs (Williamson, 1975).  Market mechanism works well if the 
upstream and downstream industries are less concentrated.  However, if upstream and 
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downstream industries are concentrated, firms in the focal industry may have limited 
supply and distribution options.  That is, highly concentrated supply or demand industries 
can lead to higher costs transacting relationships against a focal industry (Cool and 
Henderson, 1998; Pfeffer and Salancik, 2003; Porter, 1980; Waldman and Jensen, 1998; 
Williamson, 1975, 1985). 
A small numbers bargaining problem can emerge when firms deal with supply 
chain partners in highly concentrated industries (Bozarth, Handfield, and Das 1998; 
Williamson, 1975, 1985).  Interacting with supply chain partners in concentrated 
industries can generate transaction costs because of frictions in business exchanges 
(Frazier and Rody 1991; Geyskens, Steenkamp, and Kumar 1999).  Supply chain partners 
in highly concentrated upstream and/or downstream industries can exert bargaining 
power over firms in the focal industry (Porter, 1980).  Firms in the focal industry may 
encounter inflexibility and high switching costs when dealing with supply chain partners 
in concentrated industries, and thus become vulnerable (Bucklin and Sengupta, 1993; 
Harvey and Speier, 2000; Lusch and Brown, 1996; Monteverde and Teece, 1982). 
Bargaining power displayed by supply chain partners raises the threat of 
opportunism and may cause substantial transaction costs (Artz and Brush, 2000; Cool and 
Henderson, 1998; Dahlstrom and Nygaard, 1999; Saussier, 2000; Porter, 1980; 
Williamson, 1985, 1995).  Examples of opportunistic behaviors include unanticipated 
price or quality changes, distortion of demand information, threat of switching suppliers, 
short-notice of marketing campaigns, distortion of market and demand information, etc. 
(Dahlstrom and Nygaard, 1999; Gulati and Singh, 1998; Porter, 1980; Williamson, 1985).  
Firms may lack the capability to overcome these opportunistic behaviors through vertical 
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integration (Porter, 1980).  Further, in a highly concentrated upstream or downstream 
industry, large firms may exercise power against business partners to force cooperation.  
Accordingly, supply chain members are exposed to greater opportunism (Artz and Brush, 
2000; Dahlstrom and Nygaard, 1999; Lee, Clark, and Tam, 1999; Porter, 1980; Saussier, 
2000).  All these behaviors can translate into transaction costs in terms of bargaining, 
contracting, and monitoring activities (Artz and Brush, 2000; Dahlstrom and Nygaard, 
1999; Saussier 2000).  Consequently, focal firm’s profitability can eventually reduced 
(Cool and Henderson, 1998; Dahlstrom and Nygaard, 1999). 
Moreover, relational hazards can increase even more when there is power 
asymmetry between the focal industry and adjacent industries, where the focal industry is 
more competitive but the adjacent upstream and downstream industries are highly 
concentrated (Bucklin and Sengupta, 1993; Dahlstrom and Nygaard, 1999; Harvey and 
Speier 2000).  Opportunism may be greater under a power imbalance (Bucklin and 
Sengupta 1993; Dahlstrom and Nygaard, 1999).  The costs to manage the relationships 
between supply chain partners can be high (Artz and Brush 2000).  Also, the increase in 
transaction costs can hurt a focal firm’s profitability (Cool and Henderson, 1998; Porter, 
1980).  According to TCE, these hazards resulting from powerful supply chain partners 
require protective governance structures (Williamson, 1975). 
Hierarchical linkages can be established between firms in the focal industry and 
firms in concentrated industries to prevent the negative impacts from bargaining power 
(Buvik and Anderson, 2002; Gulati and Singh, 1998; Houston and Johnston, 2000; 
Osborn and Baughn, 1990; Ulset, 1996).  Literature has suggested that to avoid the 
hazards from powerful suppliers, firms in the focal industry tend to use tighter production 
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or distribution governance structures with supply chain partners, instead of market 
mechanisms (Geyskens, Steenkamp, and Kumar, 1999).  For instance, formal rules and 
inter-firm cooperation can be established between focal firms and powerful suppliers to 
avoid opportunism (Dahlstrom and Nygaard, 1999; Geyskens, Steenkamp, and Kumar, 
1999). Also, in order to avoid opportunism (Buvik and John, 2000; Dahlstrom and 
Nygaard, 1999) or conflicts (Frazier, 1999) from powerful downstream partners, more 
cooperative agreements should be established between industrial sellers and powerful 
buyers (Buvik and Anderson, 2002; Gulati and Singh, 1998; Houston and Johnston, 
2000; Osborn and Baughn, 1990).  So, more hierarchical mechanisms may prove be more 
effective in lowering transaction costs (Dyer, 1997; Osborn and Baughn, 1990). 
Firms in the focal industry can also use organizational modularity’s integrative 
arrangements with suppliers to safeguard transaction hazards from concentrated 
downstream industries (Williamson, 1975).  Focal firms can reduce the impacts of 
powerful customers by establishing integrative relationships with upstream suppliers or 
with other manufacturing firms through information sharing, collaborative projects, or 
inter-firm cooperation (Porter, 1980; Wiliamson, 1975).  Further, to increase their own 
bargaining power when interacting with powerful downstream supply chain members, 
focal firms might want to develop boundary-spanning arrangements with powerful 
suppliers to counter potential opportunism (Porter, 1980; Williamson, 1985).  Focal 
firms, thus, can avoid becoming the captive of powerful customers who possess 
monopolistic power (Frazier, 1999). 
In conclusion, for focal firms facing adjacent highly concentrated industries, 
modular production organizations’ hierarchical coordination mechanisms can be effective 
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safeguards in lowering transaction costs (Williamson, 1985; 1991b).  As firms in the 
focal industry attempt to conduct transactions with powerful firms in supply chains, 
organizational modularity can be the means to protect firms from transaction hazards, and 
thus minimize potential transaction costs incurred through the marketplace (Dahlstrom 
and Nygaard, 1999; Frazier, 1999; Gulati and Singh, 1998; Harvey and Speier, 2000).  
Hence, we propose the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 6a: Other things being equal, the greater the concentration of the 
primary upstream industry, the greater the level of the focal industry’s 
organizational modularity. 
Hypothesis 6b: Other things being equal, the greater the concentration of the 
primary downstream industry, the greater the level of the focal industry’s 
organizational modularity of the focal industry. 
Summary 
In this chapter, we have identified and defined industry level economic factors 
that can motivate firms to use integrative governances instead of market mechanisms.  
We also incorporate TCE and SCM perspectives to explore the relationships between 
these drivers and organizational modularity.  We have indicated how our independent 
variables can generate transaction costs if firms merely use market mechanisms to 
coordinate with supply chain members.  Specifically, the independent variables display 
different levels of opportunism, uncertainty, asset specificity, transaction frequency, 
transaction complexity, or combinations of the prior four dimensions that can raise the 
transaction costs under a market structure.  We hereby incorporate the previous 
conceptual model (Figure 3.5) and the hypotheses and present the complete conceptual 
 64
model of the industry level drivers of a focal industry’s organizational modularity (Figure 
3.6).  This model is our attempt to answer the call for a modularity theory of the firm 
(Daft and Lewin, 1993; Langlois, 2002). 
Our hypotheses explain variations of organizational modularity.  We theorize that 
firms in a focal industry will use higher modularity, i.e. more integrative organizational 
arrangements, to manage inter-firm relationships in the supply chain, with a goal of cost-
minimization.  In the next chapter, we present the data collection, industrial supply chain 
configurations, and the operationalization for variables pertaining to the hypotheses.
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FIGURE 3.6 
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CHAPTER 4 DATA AND OPERATIONALIZATIONS OF VARIABLES 
This section presents data collection methods and operationalization employed by 
this dissertation.  We conduct an industry level analysis regarding the drivers of 
organizational modularity. Based on the conceptual model in the last chapter, a model of 
industry level organizational modularity can be expressed in the following functional 
form: 
 
Organizational Modularity = f (Upstream Supply Chain Attributes, Downstream 
Supply Chain Attributes, Focal Industry Attributes) .....................................(4.1) 
  
On the left hand side, the dependent variable is the focal industry’s organizational 
modularity.  On the right hand side are the independent variables.  The upstream supply 
chain attributes include overall input heterogeneity, primary upstream industry’s 
economies of scale, and primary upstream industry’s concentration.  The downstream 
supply chain attributes include overall demand heterogeneity, primary downstream 
industry’s economies of scale, and primary downstream industry’s concentration.  Focal 
industry attributes include focal industry’s length of distribution channel, focal industry’s 
economies of scale, and focal industry’s concentration. 
We first present the sample we will analyze and then address the data to be 
collected for the measures and operationalization of the variables, followed by the 
methodology to test the hypotheses. 
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Sample and Configurations of Primary Industrial Supply Chains 
Sample 
The unit of analysis of this dissertation is a U.S. manufacturing industry.  The 
1997 version of the 6-digit North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) 
established by the U.S. Census Bureau (U.S. Ceusus Bureau, 1998), is applied to define a 
manufacturing industry.  This dissertation focuses on manufacturing industries, in that 
manufacturing industries have been the main focus in the organizational modularity 
literature (Baldwin and Clark, 1997; Langlois and Robertson, 1995; Schilling and 
Steensma, 2001; Sturgeon, 2002; Worren, Moore, and Cardona, 2002), and some of the 
constructs, such as contract manufacturing, are not pertinent to industries such as service, 
wholesale, retail, and transportation (Schilling and Steensma, 2001).  This dissertation 
includes all 473 6-digit NAICS manufacturing industries. The 1997 Economic Census is 
the main source of the dataset. 
In addition to the Economic Ceusus, this dissertation utilizes additional 1997 data 
sources to conduct a cross-sectional study, as presented below.  1997 is the latest year 
with available data for measuring all variables. 
Configurations of Primary Industrial Supply Chains 
For the purpose of this study, it is imperative to identify a focal manufacturing 
industry and the its primary upstream and downstream industries in a industrial supply 
chain.  This dissertation combines the information on the 1997 Economic Census and 
1997 Benchmark Input-Output (IO) Accounts by the Bureau of Economic Analysis 
(2004) to identify the primary supplier and customer industries of a focal industry.  
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Researchers have utilized the IO tables to define the buying and supplying relationships 
between industries (Martin, 1983; Ravenscraft, 1983; Schilling and Steensma, 2001). 
Most supply chain management scholars agree that typical supply chains include, 
from upstream toward downstream sides, raw material supply, production and operation, 
and wholesale and distribution stages before primary products reach customers 
(Bowersox and Closs, 1996, pp. 33-49; Chopra and Meindl, 2001, pp. 5-8; Christopher, 
1998, p. 13; Coyle, Bardi, and Langley, 1996, pp. 8-10; Shapiro, 2001, pp. 6; Simchi-
Levi, Kaminsky, and Simchi-Levi, 2000, pp. 1-4).  In addition, supply chains including 
the general public as final users typically consist of material suppliers, manufacturers, 
wholesalers, retailers, and consumers (Chopra and Meindl, 2001, pp. 5-8; Coyle, Bardi, 
and Langley, 1996, pp. 8-10).  This dissertation applies these generic supply chain 
models to configure industrial supply chains for 473 manufacturing industries.  The main 
setting of upstream-focal-downstream industries discussed in Chapter 3 is largely 
consistent with multi-state supply chain rationale suggested by Hult, Ketchen, and 
Nichols (2002), Hult, Ketchen, and Slater (2004), Mentzer et al. (2001), and Porter (1980, 
1985). 
On the upstream side of each focal industry, the Direct Requirements Table in the 
1997 Benchmark Input-Output Accounts by the Bureau of Economic Analysis is used to 
find all the supply industries of the focal manufacturing industry (Bureau of Economic 
Analysis, 2004).  These supply industries are then sorted in the order of their 
contributions to the dollar value of focal industries’ products.  The supply industry with 
the largest contribution is considered the primary supply industry to the focal industry. 
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The Use Table of the 1997 Benchmark Input-Output Accounts is employed to 
identify the primary final users of each focal industry’s products.  If the primary final 
users cannot be identified from the Use Table, the Make Table is then employed to aid 
the search.  A primary final user of a focal industry is the industry that uses the most of 
focal industry’s products in terms of dollar values (Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2004).  
After the primary final users are found, we apply the aforementioned generic supply 
chain models and utilize the NAICS categorization in conjunction with its online search 
systems to identify the industrial channels related to the distribution of the focal 
industries’ products (U.S. Census Bureau, 2004b).  The industrial distribution channels 
typically consist of wholesale industries and retail industries. 
Several scenarios emerge when we construct industrial supply chains.  First, the 
primary final user may be closely related to the focal industry and mainly consume the 
focal industry’s products.  For instance, aircraft manufacturing industry (NAICS 336411) 
is the sole customer to aircraft engine manufacturing industry (NAICS 336412).  For the 
similar cases, we assume that focal industries’ products go directly to the final users 
without passing intermediate processes. On the other hand, for supply chains in which 
primary final users do not directly procure from focal manufacturers, we assume that the 
products of the focal industries will go through distribution channels prior to reaching the 
final users.  If the primary final user is the consumer market (NAICS F01000, Personal 
Consumption Expenditures) or the private enterprise market (NAICS F02000, Private 
Fixed Investment), we use the NAICS search systems to identify the wholesale and retail 
industries that distribute the focal industry’s products to the end customers. 
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Figure 4.1 illustrates the construction of the computer manufacturing industry’s 
supply chain. The NAICS number assigned for the industry is 334111.  The primary 
upstream industry to the computer manufacturing industry is the semiconductor industry 
(NAICS 334413).  The primary downstream industry to the computer manufacturing 
industry is the computer wholesale industry (NAICS 421430).  The next downstream 
industry in the primary supply chain is the computer retail industry (NAICS 443120).  
The Private Fixed Investment (NAICS F02000) is the next and final node of the primary 
supply chain for the computer manufacturing industry. 
In order to validate all 473 industrial supply chains, three researchers participated 
to review the constructions of these chains.  Each researcher individually applied the 
previous rationales to examine industrial chains.  The final form of each industrial chain 
was determined based on the agreement of all researchers. 
Dependent Variable 
Organizational Modularity 
This study follows Schilling and Steensma’s (2001, p.1151) operationalization of 
organizational modularity.  The measure of an industry’s organizational modularity 
consists of three dimensions: contract manufacturing, alliance formation, and alternative 
employment. 
Contract manufacturing is measured by a manufacturing industry’s expenditure 
on contract work as a percentage of the total cost of materials. The data source is the 
1997 Census of Manufacturers (Schilling and Steensma, 2001). 
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Alternative employment is measured by dividing the number of alternative 
employees by total employment in an industry in 1997 (Schilling and Steensma, 2001).  
The data source is the 1997 Current Population Survey (CPS) by the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics.  The Bureau of Labor Statistics has conducted a Supplement to the February 
1997 Current Population Survey to investigate the practices of alternative employment 
arrangements.  The categories of alternative employment arrangements and definitions 
are as follows, with survey items inside the parentheses (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
1997; Houseman, 1999): 
1. Agency temporary (PES2; PES2INS): Agency temporaries are employees of a 
staffing firm (i.e. temporary agency) that places them with a client firm.  This 
placement is usually on a short-term basis, and the client firms usually direct the 
work of agency temporaries. 
2. Leased (PES2; PES2INS): Similar to agency temporaries, leased employees are 
employees of a staffing firm.  However, their assignments to the client firms are 
typically on a long-term basis. 
3. Contract company workers (PES6): “Contract company workers are employed by 
a company that contracts out their services to a client, but the contract company 
directs their work” (Houseman, 1999). 
4. Independent contractor (PES7; PES8IC): “Legally, independent contractors are 
self-employed and must direct their own work” (Houseman, 1999).  Independent 
contractors obtain clients on their own and perform work such as independent 
contractors, independent consultants, or free-lance workers (BLS, 2003). 
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5. On-call Workers (PES4; PES4A), Day Laborer (PES5), and Direct-hire 
Temporary (PES1A, B, C, and D): “On-call workers are hired only on an as 
needed basis.  Thus, while their job may not be temporary, their hours of work 
typically vary” (Houseman, 1999).  Also, direct hire temporaries tend to be hired 
on a short-term basis and perform on a specific project (Houseman, 1999). 
The interest of this dissertation is the alternative employment that belongs to the 
hybrid governance mode of transaction cost economics.  On-call works, day laborers, and 
direct-hire temporaries are part of a spot labor market, and are thus excluded from our 
calculation (Houseman, 1999; Williamson, 1985).  In contrast, agency temporaries, 
leased employees, contract company workers, and independent contractors, usually are 
part of inter-firm employment arrangements, and thus are considered hybrid employment 
arrangements.  This is consistent with the alternative employment measure of Schilling 
and Steensma (2001). 
The original industrial grouping system applied in the CPS is the 1990 Census 
classification system that is different from both NAICS and SIC.  We utilize the Industry 
and Occupation Crosswalks table between NAICS 1997 and 1990 Census codes (U.S. 
Census Bureau, 2005a) to convert the original CPS counts into NAICS measures. 
Alliance formation is measured by dividing the alliances and joint ventures 
counts in an industry by the number of firms in that industry to get the degree of alliance 
formation for 1997 (Schilling and Steensma, 2001).  The data source is the Joint 
Venture/Alliance database in the Thompson Financial’s SDC Platinum system.  The 
original industrial grouping system in the SDC Platinum package is the U.S. Standard 
Industrial Classification (SIC) system.  We utilize the correspondence table between 
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NAICS 1997 and SIC (U.S. Census Bureau, 2005b) to convert the SIC counts into 
NAICS measures. 
Overall modularity is operationalized through two steps.  First, each of the prior 
three measures is standardized.  Then the three standardized values for each industry are 
combined together with equal weight to get the measure of overall modularity for a single 
6-digit NAICS industry (Schilling and Steensma, 2001). 
Independent Variables 
Overall input heterogeneity.  To measure the input heterogeneity of a focal 
industry, we use the 1997 Benchmark IO tables that provide data on every commodity 
category input used by a focal industry.  The input heterogeneity of the upstream industry 
is measured by counting every commodity category used by the focal industry (Schilling 
and Steensma, 2001). 
Overall demand heterogeneity.  To measure the demand heterogeneity of a focal 
industry, we use the 1997 Benchmark IO tables that provide data on every commodity 
category produced by a focal industry.  Measuring the heterogeneity of demand to the 
focal industry requires several steps.  First, we identify all commodity categories 
produced by a focal industry.  In the next step, for each of those commodity categories, 
all purchasing industries of the commodity category are also identified.  We count the 
numbers of all purchasing industries of each commodity and sum up the counts of all 
commodities.  The resulting measure of the summation thus includes every purchasing 
industry for every commodity category produced by the focal industry (Schilling and 
Steensma, 2001). 
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The focal industry’s length of distribution channel.  We apply supply chain 
management expert conceptualizations of industrial supply chains to obtain a proxy of the 
focal industry’s length of distribution channel (Bowersox and Closs, 1996; Chopra and 
Meindl, 2001; Christopher, 1998; Coyle, Bardi, and Langley, 1996; Shapiro, 2001; 
Simchi-Levi, Kaminsky, and Simchi-Levi, 2000).  The distribution channel length is 
measured by counting the numbers of industries downstream to the focal industry in a 
primary supply chain. 
Scale economies: minimum efficient scale (MES).  We propose to use minimal 
efficient scale (MES) as a proxy for scale economies (Hennart and Park, 1994; Hladik, 
1985).  The Census Bureau has set employment size classes for industries and assigned 
each manufacturing establishment to one of the size classes based on the number of 
regular employees.  In the 1997 Economic Census, there are 10 size classes for 
manufacturing industries, ranging from establishments with 1-4 employees to 
establishments with 2,500 employees or more.  Also, in the past Economic Census, the 
Census Bureau has surveyed manufacturing establishments to obtain information about 
each establishment’s annual dollar value of production output (products manufactured 
plus receipts for services rendered, U.S. Census Bureau, 1997).  In addition, the Census 
Bureau reports the total dollar value of production output of all establishments in each 
size class as well as total output dollar value of the entire 6-digit NAICS industry (U.S. 
Census Bureau, 1997; Hladik, 1985). 
This dissertation measures the scale economies of an industry by calculating the 
MES relative to industry output value at the 6-digit NAICS level.  To calculate MES, we 
use the following steps to measure it.  First, we calculate the sum of production output 
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dollar value of establishments in the median and all higher size classes.  Since output 
dollar value in size classes below the median are typically small, we only use the 
production output in the median and higher classes to calculate this proxy for scale 
economies.  Then, we divide the sum by the total number of establishments in these size 
classes.  The MES is therefore the mean of aggregate annual output dollar value at these 
size classes measured in U.S. million dollars (Hennart and Park, 1994; Hladik, 1985).  
Finally, we divide the MES by the total output dollar value of the NAICS industry 
(Hennart and Park, 1994; Hladik, 1985).  This is a measure of MES relative to an 
industry output size and can be comparable across industries.  A high relative MES 
indicates that firms in the higher size classes share a larger percentage of production 
output on average and indicates larger economies of scale (Hladik, 1985). 
Concentration of an industry.  An industry’s concentration ratio is measured by 
top four firms’ percentage of output dollar value in a 6-digit NAICS industry (Levy, 
1985; McDonald, 1985; Ravenscraft, 1983).  The measures for all industries are collected 
from the 1997 Economic Census. 
Figure 4.1 also provides the values of the relevant variable measures for the 
computer manufacturing industry. The organizational modularity is measured in terms of 
three standardized component values.  The Contract Manufacturing value is -.69, the 
Alternative Employment value is -.67, and the Alliance Formation value is 3.53.  The 
Overall Organizational Modularity is the sum of the previous components and thus scores 
2.17.  The input and demand heterogeneity measures are 181 and 5285, respectively. 
Additionally, the distributional channel length is three.  The value of minimum efficient 
scale is .3 per cent. Finally, the concentration rate of top four firms is 45 per cent. 
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Control Variables 
Vertical integration.  Since we are interested in a focal firm’s use of modularity 
as an alternative to market mechanisms, it is imperative to hold the degree of vertical 
integration constant.  Economics and management literature has used the ratio of value 
added over sales as an proxy for vertical integration (Balakrishnan and Wernerfelt, 1986; 
Brush and Karnani, 1996; Levy, 1985; Jacobsen, 1988).  We propose to use two 
measures, value added and dollar value of output, obtained from the 1997 Economic 
Census to operationalize the focal industry’s vertical integration.  The value added 
measure is derived by “subtracting the cost of materials supplies, containers, fuel, 
purchased electricity, and contract work from the value of shipments” (U.S. Census 
Bureau, 1997).  We derive the focal industry’s degree of vertical integration by dividing 
the industry’s value added by the total value of shipments.  The higher the measure, the 
more integrated the industry.  This is consistent with the TCE prediction that greater 
vertical integration can be more efficient and perform better (Williamson, 1975). 
Labor intensity.  Modularity researchers have shown that the level of labor 
intensity can potentially affect manufacturing firms’ decisions concerning using 
cooperative governance structures, such as outsourcing and alliances (Schilling and 
Steensma, 2001).  To control this effect, we control labor intensity by calculating the 
number of employees per dollar value of production outputs for a manufacturing industry 
(Schilling and Steensma, 2001). 
Standardization of Independent Variable Measures 
After calculating the measures for independent and control variables, we 
standardize the values according to Schilling and Steensma (2001).  We use the initial 
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values to calculate descriptive statistics.  The measures utilized in regression analyses (to 
be discussed in detail in the next chapter) are standardized values. 
Preview of the Methodology to Test Hypotheses 
Regression techniques will be applied to test our hypotheses. Complete discussion 
of statistical testing procedures will be provided in the next chapter.  Here we briefly lay 
out the construction of the regression model for organizational modularity and how 
hypotheses will be tested based on the regression outcomes.  Specification of the 
regression model is as follows: 
 
Organizational Modularity = b0 + b1 Input Heterogeneity + b2 Demand Heterogeneity + 
b3 Length of Distribution Channel + b4 Focal Industry Scale Economies + b5 Upstream 
Scale Economies + b6 Downstream Scale Economies + b7 Focal Industry Concentration 
+ b8 Upstream Concentration + b9 Downstream Concentration + b10 Vertical Integration 
+ b11 Labor Intensity + error terms...........................................................................(4.2) 
 
According to Hypotheses 1a and 1b, we argue that input and demand 
heterogeneity will have positive impacts on a focal industry’s organizational modularity. 
So b1 and b2 are expected to be positive.  Hypothesis 2 indicates distance from the focal 
industry to final markets will positively affect the focal industry’s organizational 
modularity, so b3 should be positive.  According to Hypothesis 3, the higher the focal 
industry scale economies, the higher the focal industry’s organizational modularity.  So 
we expect b4 to be positive.  Hypotheses 4a and 4b suggest that if upstream and 
downstream industries have higher scale economies, the focal industry will have higher 
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modularity.  So we expect b5 and b6 positive.  Hypothesis 5 suggests that higher 
concentration in the focal industry will lead to higher organizational modularity.  So b7 
shall be positive.  Hypotheses 6a and 6b indicate that the more concentrated the upstream 
and downstream industries, the higher the organizational modularity in the focal industry. 
So we expected b8 and b9 to be positive. 
Summary 
In this chapter we have presented our sample and data collection for our industry 
level analysis.  A 6-digit NAICS manufacturing industry is the unit of analysis of this 
dissertation.  The 1997 Economic Census is the main data source.  We have specified the 
operationalizations of relevant variables.  This dissertation applies the measure 
constructed by Schilling and Steensma (2001) to measure overall organizational 
modularity.  We propose conducting regression analysis to test our hypotheses.  In the 
next chapter, we will detail the statistical procedures of hypotheses testing and discuss 
results. 
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CHAPTER 5 METHODOLOGY AND DISCUSSION 
This chapter focuses on the statistical analyses of the data detailed in chapter 4.  
We first report specific regression runs and results.  Hypotheses and regression outcomes 
are compared and examined.  We also discuss managerial implications and industry 
examples based on our findings.  This chapter concludes with a discussion of research 
limitations and future research directions pertaining to this dissertation. 
Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Coefficients 
Table 5.1 presents the descriptive statistics and the correlation coefficients of the 
non-standardized values of all variable measures.  The correlation coefficients and 
pertinent significances do not change for standardized values.  Several correlation 
coefficients, in particular, those between scale economies and concentration variables, are 
larger than .50, similar to the coefficient between scale economies and concentration in 
Hennart and Park (1994).  Although incorporating scale economies and concentration 
variables simultaneously in regression runs is not uncommon in industry level studies 
(see Caves, Khalilzadeh-Shirazi, and Porter, 1975; Comanor and Wilson, 1967; Hennart 
and Park, 1994; Khalilzadeh-Shirazi, 1974; Levy, 1985; Ravenscraft, 1983), they could 
suggest potential multicollinearity that can cause imprecise regression results (Greene, 
2000).  Therefore, the variance inflation factor (VIF) for each independent variable is 
further examined by utilizing SPSS statistics software (Bae and Gargiulo, 2004; Greene, 
2000; Neter, Wasserman, and Kunter, 1990).  The accepted threshold in the statistics and 
management literature is 10, and all VIF scores of the independent variables are within  
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TABLE 5.1 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS 
Variable Mean s.d.a 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 
1. Overall 
Modularity –.084 1.567               
2. Contract 
Manufacturing .035 .045  .652**              
3. Alternative 
Employment .020 .030  .668**   .095*             
4. Alliance 
Formation .064 .162   .350** –.102*   .020            
5. Input 
Heterogeneity    152.186 39.380   .101*   .118* –.052   .133**           
6. Demand 
Heterogeneity 2,215.019 1,737.406   .099*   .131**   .041 –.085   .535**          
7. Length of 
Distribution 
Channel 
2.093 .836 –.025 –.091   .061 –.105* –.127** –.214**         
8. Focal Industry 
Scale 
Economies 








.004 .009   .007 –.013 –.100*   .160**   .044   .020 –.423**   .275**   .174**      
11. Focal Industry 








29.049 21.588 –.041 –.062 –.101*   .178**   .186**   .132** –.484**   .138**   .130**   .526**   .217**   .142**   
14. Vertical 
Integration .507 .123   .273**   .336**   .190** –.079   .047   .098*   .028 –.154** –.071 –.185** –.115* –.096* –.035  
15. Labor Intensity .006 .004   .257**   .372**   .223** –.268** –.067   .088   .116* –.220 –.140** –.148** –.448** –.160** –.136**   .448** 
a. s.d. stands for standard deviation. * p < .05; ** p < .01 
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the range between 1.318 and 2.188.  Since no VIF exceeds 10, multicollinearity might not 
have a serious influence over the regression results (Bae and Gargiulo, 2004; Neter, 
Wasserman, and Kunter, 1990). 
Statistical Procedures for Testing Hypotheses 
To test the hypotheses, this dissertation follows the statistical methods 
documented in the econometrics and modularity literature for regression analyses 
(Greene, 2000; Johnston and DiNardo, 1997; Schilling and Steensma, 2001).  All 
regression runs and heteroscdeasticity tests are performed using STATA software.  Here 
we briefly review the specification of regression models discussed in chapter 4 and then 
detail the statistical procedures of hypotheses testing. 
Specification of the Regression Model  
Based on the conceptual model in chapter 3, the model of industry level 
organizational modularity can be expressed in the following functional form: 
 
Organizational Modularity = f (Upstream Supply Chain Attributes, Downstream 
Supply Chain Attributes, Focal Industry Attributes) .....................................(5.1) 
 
To the left, the dependent variable is the focal industry’s organizational 
modularity.  To the right are the independent variables.  The upstream supply chain 
attributes include overall input heterogeneity, primary upstream industry’s economies of 
scale, and the primary upstream industry’s concentration.  The downstream supply chain 
attributes include overall demand heterogeneity, primary downstream industry’s 
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economies of scale, and primary downstream industry’s concentration.  Focal industry 
attributes include focal industry’s length of industrial distribution channel, focal 
industry’s scale economies, and focal industry’s concentration. 
In order to construct regression models consistently with past research, model 
specifications in multiple industry level studies are reviewed (see Cool and Henderson, 
1998; Caves, Khalilzadeh-Shirazi, and Porter, 1975; Comanor and Wilson, 1967; Hennart 
and Park, 1994; Khalilzadeh-Shirazi, 1974; Levy, 1985; MacDonald, 1985; Ravenscraft, 
1983; Schilling and Steensma, 2001).  The following model specifies the regression on 
overall organizational modularity: 
 
Organizational Modularity = b0 + b1 Input Heterogeneity + b2 Demand Heterogeneity + 
b3 Length of Distribution Channel + b4 Focal Industry Scale Economies + b5 Upstream 
Scale Economies + b6 Downstream Scale Economies + b7 Focal Industry Concentration 
+ b8 Upstream Concentration + b9 Downstream Concentration + b10 Vertical Integration 
+ b11 Labor Intensity + error terms...........................................................................(5.2) 
 
Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression runs constitute the first step of the 
hypotheses tests (Schilling and Steensma, 2001).  Further diagnostic regression 
procedures are performed if the analyses of error terms suggest heteroscedasticity.  As 
discussed in chapter 4 (p. 69), the values of the right-hand side variables of equation 5.2 
are standardized measures.  Based on our predictions detailed in chapter 3, we argue that 
explanatory variables on the right hand side of 5.2 have positive impacts on a focal 
industry’s organizational modularity.  We thus anticipate that b1 through b9 will be 
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positive and significant.  Furthermore, we conduct regression runs for individual 
components of overall modularity to explore the explanatory variables’ impacts on the 
three dimensions of organizational modularity – contract manufacturing, alternative 
employment, and alliance formation (Schilling and Steensma, 2001).  We next examine 
the properties of the error terms. 
Test of Heteroscedasticity and Diagnose 
Since this dissertation employs cross-sectional data sources in 1997, it is 
necessary to conduct tests for heteroscedasticity that is common in cross-sectional data 
sets (Greene, 2000; Johnston and DiNardo, 1997).  More specifically, heteroscedasiticity 
is a typical property of cross-sectional data sets where the error terms of each observation 
are not constant.  In this dissertation, after each OLS run, White and Breusch-Pagan tests 
are performed for each individual regression model to test heteroscedasticity (Greene, 
2000; Johnston and DiNardo, 1997).  If heteroscedasticity is significant, we perform 
weighted least squares (WLS) regression runs to diagnose this problem (Greene, 2000; 
Johnston and DiNardo, 1997).  Econometrics scholars suggest that while OLS 
coefficients are unbiased, WLS can provide more efficient results in terms of smaller 
coefficient standard errors.  Thus WLS outcomes may be more precise for hypotheses 
testing (Greene, 2000; Johnston and DiNardo, 1997). 
Regression Results and Tests of Hypotheses 
In this section we report respective regression analyses in the following order: 
overall modularity, contract manufacturing, alternative employment, and alliance 
formation. 
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Model for Overall Modularity 
OLS is performed to obtain a baseline model for overall modularity.  In order to 
further account for the potential impacts of multicollinearity between scale economies 
variables and concentration variables, we perform additional regression runs.  In Table 
5.2, the second column reports the regression analysis excluding concentration variables.  
The third column presents the regression run without scale economies variables.  In 
general, the coefficients in the two additional regressions are consistent with those in the 
full models in terms of signs and significance levels.  Hence, as suggested by our prior 
VIF test results, the high correlation between scale economies and concentration 
variables appear not to cause serious effects on our regression outcomes. 
Two tests for heteroscedasticity are performed for the full OLS regression. The 
White’s test statistic is 71.798 (p = .646), while Breusch-Pagan test statistic is 89.592 (p 
= .000).  According to the Breusch-Pagan test, heteroscedasticity is highly significant.  
Therefore, we performed additional WLS runs to account for heteroscedasticity. Columns 
4 and 5 in Table 5.2 summarize the outcomes of the OLS and the WLS regressions for 
the full model. The WLS results are largely consistent with the OLS results with respect 
to coefficient signs and significance. In general, the WLS coefficients have smaller 
standard errors and the WLS model shows a higher fit (R2), compared to the OLS model. 
With reference to Table 5.2, the regression runs on overall modularity show 
support for several hypotheses.  The coefficients of input heterogeneity are positive and 
significant in both the OLS (.163, p < .05) and the WLS (.142, p < .05) models; hence, 
hypothesis 1a is supported.  In addition, the coefficients of focal industry scale economies 
are positive and significant in both the OLS (.293, p < .05) and the WLS (.321, p < .05) 
 86
TABLE 5.2 
RESULTS OF REGRESSION ANALYSES FOR OVERALL MODULARITY AS THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
Variable OLS OLS OLS WLS 
Constant –.097+     (.072) –.154*     (.070) –.130*     (.072) –.122*     (.069) 
Input Heterogeneity   .146*     (.087)   .122+     (.085)   .163*     (.087)   .142*     (.081) 
Demand Heterogeneity   .042       (.087)   .025       (.086)   .028       (.087)   .037       (.083) 
Length of Distribution 
Channel 
–.010       (.086) –.074       (.085) –.023       (.088) –.064       (.079) 
Focal Industry Scale 
Economies 
  .154*     (.093)    .293*     (.150)   .321*     (.146) 
Upstream Industry Scale 
Economies 
–.125       (.100)  –.051       (.121) –.015       (.077) 
Downstream Industry 
Scale Economies 
  .062       (.105)    .166+     (.114)   .157*     (.093) 
Focal Industry 
Concentration 
 –.022       (.091) –.124       (.108) –.161+     (.102) 
Upstream Industry 
Concentration 
 –.213**   (.074) –.189*     (.090) –.176*     (.078) 
Downstream Industry 
Concentration 
 –.116+     (.085) –.178*     (.094) –.158*     (.086) 
Vertical Integration   .324*** (.086)   .267**   (.085)   .304*** (.087)   .295*** (.079) 
Labor Intensity   .280*** (.082)   .293*** (.088)   .264**   (.088)   .230**   (.087) 
     
R2   .118   .145   .155   .185 
F 7.011*** 8.691*** 6.761*** 8.39*** 
N 430 420 418 418 
+ p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001; one-tailed tests. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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models showing support for hypothesis 3.  Finally, the coefficients of downstream 
industry scale economies are positive and significant in both the OLS (.166, p < .10) and 
the WLS (.157, p < .05) models. As a result, hypothesis 4b is supported.  
The analyses of overall modularity, on the other hand, also display surprising 
outcomes opposite to the prediction of several hypotheses.  The coefficient of focal 
industry concentration is negative and significant in the WLS (–.161, p < .10) model, 
which is opposite to the prediction in hypothesis 5.  In addition, the coefficients of 
upstream industry concentration are negative and significant in both the OLS (–.189, p < 
.05) and the WLS (–.176, p < .05) models, thereby opposite to the prediction in 
hypothesis 6a.  Finally, the coefficients of downstream industry concentration are 
negative and significant in both the OLS (–.178, p < .05) and the WLS (–.158, p < .05) 
models, opposite to the prediction in hypothesis 6b. 
Next we examine individual components of overall modularity in order to get 
more insights as to how modularity drivers impact each dimension of organizational 
modularity. 
Model for Contract Manufacturing 
OLS is performed to obtain a baseline model for contract manufacturing. 
Furthermore, we test for heteroscedasticity.  The White’s test statistic is 71.543 (p = 
.654), while the Breusch-Pagan test statistic is 116.023 (p = .000).  According to the 
Breusch-Pagan test, heteroscedasticity is highly significant. Therefore, we perform 
additional WLS runs to account for heteroscedasticity.  Table 5.3 summarizes the 
outcomes of the OLS and WLS regressions.  The WLS results are largely consistent with 
the OLS results with respect to coefficient signs and significance.  In general, the WLS 
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coefficients have smaller standard errors, while the model as a whole demonstrates a 
higher fit (R2), compared to the OLS model. 
TABLE 5.3 
RESULTS OF REGRESSION ANALYSES FOR CONTRACT 
MANUFACTURING AS THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
Variable OLS WLS 
Constant –.027       (.045) –.029       (.042) 
Input Heterogeneity   .119*     (.054)   .115**   (.045) 
Demand Heterogeneity –.026       (.054) –.049       (.052) 
Length of Distribution 
Channel 
–.118*     (.055) –.101*     (.046) 
Focal Industry Scale 
Economies 
  .091       (.094)   .077       (.070) 
Upstream Industry Scale 
Economies 
–.063       (.076) –.063       (.060) 
Downstream Industry Scale 
Economies 
  .061       (.071)   .054       (.062) 
Focal Industry 
Concentration 
–.190**   (.068) –.182*** (.056) 
Upstream Industry 
Concentration 
–.047       (.056) –.063+     (.044) 
Downstream Industry 
Concentration 
–.094+     (.059) –.071+     (.052) 
Vertical Integration   .215*** (.055)   .154*** (.040) 
Labor Intensity   .224*** (.055)   .248*** (.052) 
   
R2   .232   .262 
F 11.117*** 13.07*** 
N 418 418 
+ p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001; one-tailed tests. Standard errors are in 
parentheses. 
 
With respect to contract manufacturing, regression outcomes in Table 5.3 show 
support for the hypothesis pertaining to input heterogeneity.  The coefficients of input 
heterogeneity are positive and significant in both the OLS (.119, p < .05) and the WLS 
(.115, p < .05) models.  This result is consistent with the modularity regression with 
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respect to input heterogeheity.  However, regression analyses of contract manufacturing 
also display unexpected outcomes, opposite to the prediction of several hypotheses.  The 
coefficient of demand heterogeneity is negative and significant in both the OLS (–.118, p 
< .05) and the WLS (–.101, p < .05) models, opposite to the expectations of hypothesis 
1b.  The coefficients of focal industry concentration are negative and significant in both 
the OLS (–.190, p < .01) and the WLS (–.182, p < .001) models, opposite to the 
prediction from hypothesis 5.  Additionally, the coefficient of upstream industry 
concentration is negative and significant in the WLS (–.063, p < .10) model, opposite to 
the prediction of hypothesis 6a.  Finally, the coefficients of downstream industry 
concentration are negative and significant in both the OLS (–.094, p < .10) and the WLS 
(–.071, p < .10) models, opposite to the prediction in hypothesis 6b. 
Model for Alternative Employment 
OLS is performed to obtain a baseline model for alternative employment.  
Additionally, the result of the White’s test statistic on heteroscedasticity is 90.150 (p = 
.145), while the Breusch-Pagan test statistic is 440.084 (p = .000).  According to the 
Breusch-Pagan test, heteroscedasticity is highly significant. Therefore, we performed 
additional WLS runs to account for heteroscedasticity.  Table 5.4 summarizes the 
outcomes of both the OLS and the WLS regressions.  The WLS results are largely 
consistent with the OLS results with respect to coefficient signs and significance.  In 
general, WLS coefficients have smaller standard errors and the model displays a higher 
fit (R2), compared to the OLS model. 
Based on Table 5.4, in terms of alternative employment, regression runs provide 
results consistent with the prediction of several hypotheses.  The coefficients of demand 
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heterogeneity are positive and significant in both the OLS (.102, p < .05) and the WLS 
(.124, p < .01) models.  In addition, the coefficients of focal industry concentration are 
positive and significant in both the OLS (.088, p < .10) and the WLS (.082, p < .10) 
models.  
TABLE 5.4 
RESULTS OF REGRESSION ANALYSES FOR ALTERNATIVE 
EMPLOYMENT AS THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
Variable OLS WLS 
Constant –.031     (.046) –.030       (.041) 
Input Heterogeneity –.090+   (.055) –.069+     (.045) 
Demand Heterogeneity   .102*   (.058)   .124**   (.049) 
Length of Distribution 
Channel 
  .045     (.056)   .017       (.047) 
Focal Industry Scale 
Economies 
–.064     (.073) –.026       (.060) 
Upstream Industry Scale 
Economies 
  .030     (.079) –.019       (.048) 
Downstream Industry Scale 
Economies 
–.002     (.058) –.036       (.038) 
Focal Industry 
Concentration 
  .088+   (.068)   .082+     (.058) 
Upstream Industry 
Concentration 
–.124*   (.058) –.073+     (.048) 
Downstream Industry 
Concentration 
–.073     (.061) –.074+     (.047) 
Vertical Integration   .076+   (.053)   .056+     (.043) 
Labor Intensity   .178** (.058)   .140**   (.053) 
   
R2   .094    .115 
F 4.128*** 5.16*** 
N 448 448 
+ p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001; one-tailed tests. Standard errors are in 
parentheses. 
 
The analyses on alternative employment also display surprising outcomes, 
opposite to the predictions of several hypotheses.  The coefficients of input heterogeneity 
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are negative and significant in both the OLS (–.090, p < .10) and the WLS (–.069, p < 
.10) models, opposite to the prediction of hypothesis 1a.  In addition, the coefficients of 
upstream industry concentration are negative and significant in both the OLS (–.124, p < 
.05) and the WLS (–.073, p < .10) models, opposite to the predictions from hypothesis 6a.  
Finally, the coefficient of downstream industry concentration is negative and significant 
in the WLS (–.074, p < .10) model, opposite to the prediction in hypothesis 6b. 
Model for Alliance Formation 
OLS is performed to obtain a baseline model for alliance formation.  Tests for 
heteroscedasticity indicate that it may be prevalent.  The White’s test statistic is 208.779 
(p = .000), while the Breusch-Pagan test statistic is 404.456 (p = .000); i.e., both tests are 
significant.  Therefore, we performed WLS runs to account for heteroscedasticity.  Table 
5.5 summarizes the outcomes of the OLS and the WLS regressions.  The WLS results 
largely display consistency with the OLS results.  In general, the WLS coefficients have 
smaller standard errors and the model as a whole displays a higher fit (R2), compared to 
the OLS model. 
According to Table 5.5, regression runs on alliance formation show support for 
several hypotheses.  The coefficients of input heterogeneity are positive and significant in 
both the OLS (.208, p < .001) and the WLS (.192, p < .001) models.  This results support 
hypothesis 1a.  In addition, the coefficients of focal industry scale economies are positive 
and significant in both the OLS (.413, p < .001) and the WLS (.390, p < .001) models.  
This result confirms hypothesis 3.  Finally, the coefficient of downstream industry scale 
economies is positive and significant in the WLS (.071, p < .10) models.  This result 
provides support for hypothesis 4b.  However, the analyses for alliance formation also 
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display surprising outcomes opposite to the predictions of one hypothesis.  The 
coefficients of downstream heterogeneity are negative and significant in both the OLS (–
.084, p < .05) and the WLS (–.072, p < .05) models, opposite to the prediction of 
hypothesis 6b. 
TABLE 5.5 
RESULTS OF REGRESSION ANALYSES FOR ALLIANCE FORMATION AS 
THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
Variable OLS WLS 
Constant –.033       (.030) –.035       (.028) 
Input Heterogeneity   .208*** (.037)   .192*** (.033) 
Demand Heterogeneity –.084*     (.038) –.072*     (.036) 
Length of Distribution 
Channel 
  .016       (.037)   .028       (.032) 
Focal Industry Scale 
Economies 
  .413*** (.049)   .390*** (.040) 
Upstream Industry Scale 
Economies 
  .005       (.053) –.007       (.049) 
Downstream Industry Scale 
Economies 
  .021       (.038)   .071+     (.053) 
Focal Industry 
Concentration 
  .003       (.045)   .003       (.039) 
Upstream Industry 
Concentration 
–.033       (.038) –.022       (.034) 
Downstream Industry 
Concentration 
  .026       (.041)   .026       (.040) 
Vertical Integration   .025       (.035)   .019       (.030) 
Labor Intensity –.138*** (.039) –.094**   (.030) 
   
R2 .296 .327 
F 16.631*** 19.22*** 
N 448 448 




Brief Summary of Hypotheses Tests 
We provide several tables to summarize the regression results and hypotheses 
tests.  Tables 5.6 and 5.7 combine the foregoing regression results from the OLS and 
WLS regressions, respectively.  Table 5.8 reports the significant coefficients in regression 
models for overall modularity, contract manufacturing, alternative employment, and 
alliance formation models, together with pertinent variables and hypotheses.  This 
summary table may offer more detailed insights as to how determinants affect each 
modularity dimensions.  Table 5.9 highlights hypotheses supported by regression results.  
In sum, hypothesis 1a is supported, particularly for contract manufacturing and 
alliance formation.  In addition, hypothesis 3 is supported, especially for alliance 
formation.  Hypothesis 4b is supported, particularly in the regression on alliance 
formation. Lastly, we also found unexpected results with regards to hypotheses 1b, 2, 5, 
and 6.  We now turn to the discussion of these results and pertinent implications. 
Discussion of Hypotheses Testing Results and Managerial Implications 
In this part of the dissertation, we examine our findings in conjunction with past 
literature.  Managerial implications and examples of the supported hypotheses follow. 
Brief explanations for surprising outcomes of hypotheses 5 and 6 are also offered. 
Hypotheses 1a – Input Heterogeneity 
Hypothesis 1a suggested that input and demand heterogeneity, respectively, can 
drive firms to utilize organizational modularity.  The regression results supported 
hypothesis 1a, in particular for contract manufacturing and alliance formation.  When  
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TABLE 5.6 
OLS RESULTS OF REGRESSION ANALYSES FOR THE DRIVERS OF ORGANIZATIONAL MODLARITY 





Constant –.130*     (.072) –.027       (.045) –.031     (.046) –.033       (.030) 
Input Heterogeneity   .163*     (.087)   .119*     (.054) –.090+   (.055)   .208*** (.037) 
Demand Heterogeneity   .028       (.087) –.026       (.054)   .102*   (.058) –.084*     (.038) 
Length of Distribution 
Channel 
–.023       (.088) –.118*     (.055)   .045     (.056)   .016       (.037) 
Focal Industry Scale 
Economies 
  .293*     (.150)   .091       (.094) –.064     (.073)   .413*** (.049) 
Upstream Industry 
Scale Economies 
–.051       (.121) –.063       (.076)   .030     (.079)   .005       (.053) 
Downstream Industry 
Scale Economies 
  .166+     (.114)   .061       (.071) –.002     (.058)   .021       (.038) 
Focal Industry 
Concentration 
–.124       (.108) –.190**   (.068)   .088+   (.068)   .003       (.045) 
Upstream Industry 
Concentration 
–.189*     (.090) –.047       (.056) –.124*   (.058) –.033       (.038) 
Downstream Industry 
Concentration 
–.178*     (.094) –.094+     (.059) –.073     (.061)   .026       (.041) 
Vertical Integration   .304*** (.087)   .215*** (.055)   .076+   (.053)   .025       (.035) 
Labor Intensity   .264**   (.088)   .224*** (.055)   .178** (.058) –.138*** (.039) 
     
R2   .155   .232   .094 .296 
F 6.761*** 11.117*** 4.128*** 16.631*** 
N 418 418 448 448 
+ p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001; one-tailed tests. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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TABLE 5.7 
WLS RESULTS OF REGRESSION ANALYSES FOR THE DRIVERS OF ORGANIZATIONAL MODULARITY 





Constant –.122*     (.069) –.029       (.042) –.030       (.041) –.035       (.028) 
Input Heterogeneity   .142*     (.081)   .115**   (.045) –.069+     (.045)   .192*** (.033) 
Demand Heterogeneity   .037       (.083) –.049       (.052)   .124**   (.049) –.072*     (.036) 
Length of Distribution 
Channel 
–.064       (.079) –.101*     (.046)   .017       (.047)   .028       (.032) 
Focal Industry Scale 
Economies 
  .321*     (.146)   .077       (.070) –.026       (.060)   .390*** (.040) 
Upstream Industry 
Scale Economies 
–.015       (.077) –.063       (.060) –.019       (.048) –.007       (.049) 
Downstream Industry 
Scale Economies 
  .157*     (.093)   .054       (.062) –.036       (.038)   .071+     (.053) 
Focal Industry 
Concentration 
–.161+     (.102) –.182*** (.056)   .082+     (.058)   .003       (.039) 
Upstream Industry 
Concentration 
–.176*     (.078) –.063+     (.044) –.073+     (.048) –.022       (.034) 
Downstream Industry 
Concentration 
–.158*     (.086) –.071+     (.052) –.074+     (.047)   .026       (.040) 
Vertical Integration   .295*** (.079)   .154*** (.040)   .056+     (.043)   .019       (.030) 
Labor Intensity   .230**   (.087)   .248*** (.052)   .140**   (.053) –.094**   (.030) 
     
R2   .185   .262    .115 .327 
F 8.39*** 13.07*** 5.16*** 19.22*** 
N 418 418 448 448 
+ p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001; one-tailed tests. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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TABLE 5.8 
SUMMARY OF REGRESSION RUNS ON OVERALL MODULARITY AND THREE COMPONENTS 
Significant Coefficients on Regression Results Variables (modularity 
Drivers) 




Input Heterogeneity + + – + H1a 
Demand Heterogeneity   + – H1b 
Length of Distribution 
Channel 
 –   H2 
Focal Industry Scale 
Economies 
+   + H3 
Upstream Industry 
Scale Economies 
    H4a 
Downstream Industry 
Scale Economies 
+   + H4b 
Focal Industry 
Concentration 
– – +  H5 
Upstream Industry 
Concentration 
– – –  H6a 
Downstream Industry 
Concentration 
– – –  H6b 
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TABLE 5.9 
SUMMARY OF HYPOTHESES TESTING ON OVERALL ORGANIZATIONAL MODULARITY 
Variables (modularity Drivers) Results Hypothesis Testing Results 
Input Heterogeneity positive and significant H1a Supported 
Demand Heterogeneity -- H1b  
Length of Distribution Channel -- H2  
Focal Industry Scale 
Economies 
positive and significant H3 Supported 
Upstream Industry Scale 
Economies 
-- H4a  
Downstream Industry Scale 
Economies 
positive and significant H4b Supported 





negative and significant H6a  
Downstream Industry 
Concentration 




input supply displays high levels of heterogeneity, firms in the focal industry may use 
organizational modularity as opposed to market mechanisms to coordinate supply chain 
activities. This evidence coincides with the Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) 
prediction that firms are more likely to establish cooperative organizational with supply 
sources when heterogeneous inputs may lead to complex supply chain activities 
(Noordewier, John, and Nevin, 1990; Buvik and Andersen, 2002; Buvik and John, 2000; 
Schilling and Steensma, 2001; Williamson, 1985).  
Our findings provide guidelines to firms to adjust inter-firm arrangements in the 
presence of various supply sources.  According our model and analysis, input 
heterogeneity is a key determinant for the industry modularity.  Managers should 
examine the extant input heterogeneity level or monitor the evolvement of input 
heterogeneity, so that they can examine the organizational modularity of an industry and 
the structure of its pertinent supply chain.  Envisioning increasing input heterogeneity, 
purchasing firms may institute modular organizations with supply chain partners in order 
to accommodate to the likely structural shift of the industry.  By acknowledging the 
impact of input heterogeneity and adjusting their inter-firm governance structures, firms 
can better position themselves within an industry and in the supply chain.  Eventually, 
better alignment between firm and industry organizational forms may lead to higher 
performance (Porter, 1980; Waldman and Jensen, 1998). This view is also consistent with 
Schilling and Steensma (2001). 
Several manufacturing industries render examples supporting our findings 
pertaining to the relationships between input heterogeneity and modularity.  Firstly, in the 
electronics manufacturing industry, the supply for production inputs comes with a high 
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variety of material sources and displays high heterogeneity.  As a result, an increasing 
number of original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) outsource manufacturing to other 
electronic manufacturing service (EMS) providers, or electronics contract manufacturers 
(CMs), to organize heterogeneous inputs (Sturgeon, 2002).  For instance, Motorola has 
contracted out significant portions of its operations to Jabil Circuit, an EMS provider.  
This prevalent contract manufacturing strategy has thus increased the organizational 
modularity in the electronics industry (Lee and Hoyt, 2001; Sturgeon, 2002).  Secondly, 
in the automobile industry, the production of cars requires thousands of materials, parts, 
and subassemblies.  Among large automakers, Toyota’s supplier network might be the 
most well-known example to streamline the management of complex and heterogeneous 
supplies. Specifically, Toyota establishes a modular network with a goal to manage an 
array of inputs and complex inbound logistics activities (Dyer and Nobeoka, 2000).  
Another example can be found in the bicycle industry where outsourcing of materials or 
sub-assemblies is common in the presence of a high level of heterogeneous inputs 
(Randall and Ulrich, 2000).  Finally, prominent corporations or industrial cooperative 
programs apply organizational modularity to process a variety of supply sources. Industry 
examples include IBM, and Sun Microsystem, and with industrial cooperative programs 
such as the B-2 bomber project (Argyres, 1999; Baldwin and Clark, 1997; Garud and 
Kumaraswamy, 1995; Pine, 1993; Schilling and Steensma, 2001). 
Hypothesis 3 – Focal Industry Scale Economies  
Hypothesis 3 proposed that higher scale economies will lead firms in the focal 
industry to use more modular organizational forms.  The regression analyses support 
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hypothesis 3, in particular for alliance formation.  The results suggest that manufacturers 
with high economies of scale may actively utilize intermediate governance structures to 
coordinate supply chain activities.  Organization management researchers predict that 
large-scale firms may align the supply chain structures with more hierarchical buyer-
supplier arrangements (Best, 1990; Gomes-Goncerres, 1996; Joshi and Stump 1999; 
Joskow 1987; Langlois and Robertson, 1995; Lyons 1996; Oxley, 1999; Ulset 1996).  
Our findings are consistent with this view.  
According to our discovery, managers can examine their industry scale economies 
to forecast industry modularity evolvement over time.  High economies of scale may 
drive firms within an industry to arrange multiple intermediate governance structures 
with suppliers and customers rather than use market mechanisms.  Accordingly, the 
overall industry modularity and related supply chain configuration may shift.  Firms 
monitoring the level of their industry scale economies may align their inter-firm 
governance choices with the emerging industry modular structure.  As a result, the 
advance alignment between firm and industry modularity may better account for costs 
related to production, transactions, and supply chain operations (Sturgeon, 2002; 
Waldman and Jensen, 1998). 
Two prominent manufacturing industries provide evidence supporting our 
findings.  First, in the aircraft industry, manufacturing firms, such as Boeing and Airbus, 
demonstrates significant scale economies in aircraft production.  The large manufacturing 
scale of this industry has motivated aircraft makers and their suppliers and buyers to 
arrange cooperative relationships.  In particular, contract manufacturing has become a 
significant way to coordinate aircraft manufacturing supply chains (Argyres, 1999; 
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Waldman and Jensen, 1998).  Additionally, in the computer industry, Dell extensively 
uses cooperative links, including contract manufacturing, logistics alliances with supply 
chain experts (e.g., UPS and Fedex), and alternative employment (outsourcing service 
manpower) to substantiate Michael Dell’s “virtual integration” vision (Magretta, 2001).  
Finally, we believe that this outcome can help explain the emerging global modular 
networks.  For examples, prominent low-cost, large-scale firms, such as Hewlett-Packard 
(H-P), and Dell, have instituted alliances or outsourced manufacturing processes to 
overseas contract manufacturers in mainland China (Dean and Tam, 2005). 
Hypothesis 4b –Downstream Scale Economies  
Hypothesis 4b propose that greater degrees of downstream scale economies may 
drive firms in a focal industry to use greater organizational modularity.  The regression 
results support hypothesis 4b, in particular for alliance formation.  These findings may 
shed light on the inter-firm arrangements between focal manufacturers and downstream 
partners.  To put it specifically, manufacturers may consider instituting organizational 
modularity to organize their interface with large-scale supply chain partners.  Our view is 
consistent with the TCE reasoning that focal firms may be motivated to establish more 
hierarchical arrangement with downstream partners because of the nontrivial dependence 
on large-scale customers (Osborn and Baughn, 1990; Williamson, 1985; 1991b). 
Our findings indicate that managers should analyze customer industry scale 
economies to predict the industry modular configuration.  High scale economies in the 
downstream industry may trigger a potential shift in both industry organization and 
supply chain outlook that may lead to more intermediate coordination mechanisms in 
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supply chains, compared to market mechanisms or vertical integration.  Industry 
modularity may thus increase.  Therefore, customer industry scale economies may impact 
not only on supply chain cost efficiencies but also the industry structures.  By foreseeing 
the changing modularity of the industry supply chain configuration, managers may 
proactively apply modularity in governance choices by establishing cooperative 
arrangement with supply chain members.  As discussed previously, this better alignment 
may lead to competitive advantages (Porter, 1980; Sturgeon, 2002; Waldman and Jensen, 
1998). 
The preceding discussion can be further supported by the following examples.  In 
the semiconductor industry, large downstream chip-packaging and testing service 
providers have motivated microchip manufacturers to implement strong ties with them 
because of the significant scale economies in chip-packaging and testing processes (FSA, 
2003).  In the computer industry, H-P, which has its own radio frequency identification 
(RFID) initiatives, establishes RFID partnerships with Walmart, a well-known large size, 
low-cost retailer, to facilitate the combined supply chain operations (Sullivan, 2004).  In 
the soft drink manufacturing industry, Pepsico, Inc. maintained a strong alliance 
relationship with Taco Bell after these two firms dissolve their former “hierarchy” 
structure.  In doing so Pepsico may leverage scale economies pertaining to the 
geographical expansion of Taco Bell stores (Manning, Rodriguez, and Ghosh, 1999). 
Additionally, hypotheses 3 and 4b may be jointly viewed to make a synergy 
argument when both the focal industry and downstream industries display scale 
economies. Using the semiconductor industry as an example again, low-cost, large-scale 
semiconductor manufacturers (e.g. Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company and 
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United Microelectronics Corporation) build cooperative relationships with their 
downstream low-cost, large-scale chip-packaging and testing firms.  The global 
electronics manufacturing network also provides an illustrations of cooperative links 
initiated by large-scale, low-cost firms lodged in different supply chain stages (Fujimoto, 
2003; Langlois and Robertson, 1995; Sturgeon, 2002, 2003). 
Hypothesis 5 and 6 – Concentration in the Focal Industry and Upstream and 
Downstream Industries 
Hypothesis 5 argues that focal industry scale economies lead to higher level of 
organizational modularity.  Hypotheses 6a and 6b suggest that upstream and downstream 
concentration will cause focal industry firms to employ more modular organizational 
forms. Surprisingly, according to the regression outcomes, higher concentration in the 
focal industry, and in up- and down-stream industries, leads to lower overall modularity. 
The latest modularity research has clearly suggested that industry concentration 
may lead to lower transaction costs and result in greater reliance on market mechanisms.  
Lead firms in concentrated industries may develop technical standards across industries 
and supply chain links that can ultimately help formalize market transactions and 
minimize coordination costs (Gereffi, Humphrey, and Sturgeon, 2005; Schilling and 
Steensma, 2001, Sturgeon, 2002, 2003).  In addition, lead firms in supply chains are more 
likely to institute inter-firm information technologies (IT).  Thanks to established 
international standards, supply chain members can use prevalent communication means 
to coordinate with lead firms in concentrated industries (Gereffi, Humphrey, and 
Sturgeon, 2005; Sturgeon, 2002, 2003).  The standardization and IT investments led by 
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large firms may reduce relation-specific investments and mutual dependence between 
supply chain partners. Consequently, business exchanges can be performed by using the 
formalized, arms-length mechanism (Sturgeon, 2003).  Greater use of market 
mechanisms will reduce industry modularity. 
Moreover, highly concentrated industries typically have smaller number of firms.  
Transaction frequencies within a concentrated industry and along its supply chains may 
be relatively fewer vis-à-vis more competitive industries (Williamson, 1975, 1985).  
Additionally, the competition between lead firms may be more stable than competitive 
industries (Waldman and Jensen, 1998).  As a result, the interface between concentrated 
industries and suppliers and customers may display lower levels of frequencies and 
uncertainties.  Transaction costs are thus reduced and in favor of market mechanisms, 
lowering industry organizational modularity. 
The Structure-Conduct-Performance perspective in the industrial organization 
(IO) literature provides a prediction in line with our findings.  IO researchers suggest that 
a concentrated industry may favor competitive pricing rather than longer term contracting 
to coordinate their supply and demand (Porter, 1980; Waldman and Jensen, 1998).  The 
fewer contracting activities between supply chain members, therefore, translate to lower 
organizational modularity. 
Limitations and Future Research 
While our findings can offer insights into the driving forces behind the 
organizational modularity phenomenon, several limitations remain.  First, as an emerging 
research area, organizational modularity can be observed through multiple established 
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theories (Langlois and Robertson, 1995; Sturgeon, 2002).  This dissertation employs TCE 
theory as the overarching theory to examine organizational modularity.  Whereas our 
regression results indicate that our conceptual model has explanatory power, our 
theoretical framework solely concentrates on the transaction costs minimization aspect of 
the firm-boundary decision.  Most certainly, firm decisions regarding operational scope 
are based on not only transaction costs but also other factors, such as production costs, 
competitive strategies, regulations, etc. (Penrose, 1959; Porter, 1980; Waldman and 
Jensen, 1998).  However, prominent theories in the strategy literature have not yet been 
thoroughly grounded into empirical modularity studies to test current predictions of this 
“paradigm shift” (Sturgeon, 2002).  Researchers interested in this area may consider 
utilizing such theoretical lenses as Structure-Conduct-Performance, Resource-Based 
View, Strategic Network, or Evolution Economics, to act as guidelines to generate 
research questions and develop hypotheses.  Ultimately, the theory-driven research on 
modularity may be able to answer research questions pertaining to the financial and 
operational impacts of modular organizations (Swamidass and Newell, 1987). These 
questions have yet to be addressed empirically by the extant modularity literature (Ethiraj 
and Levinthal, 2004b).  
The next limitation pertains to the measure of the overall organizational 
modularity applied in this dissertation.  In their seminal operationalization, Schilling and 
Steensma (2001) combine three components to measure organizational modularity.  Each 
component is equally weighed.  However, no specific unit can be identified and clearly 
interpreted with this complex construct.  In addition, while the correlation coefficients 
between modularity components are not high, as reported in both Schilling and Steensma 
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(2001) and this dissertation, the non-zero correlations may suggest that contract 
manufacturing, alternative employment, and alliance formation practices may overlap or 
could be traded off.  Future modularity research may explore other operationlization 
strategies that determine distinct weights for each component.  For instance, an 
alternative to Schilling and Steensma’s (2001) method is performing factor analysis to 
obtain a composite modularity score.  Moreover, researchers can test different 
combinations of components to see if the regression results change.  A further study on 
the unit of modularity is also in order. 
Furthermore, Schilling and Steensma (2001) pointed out that organizational 
modularity can be operationalized more broadly (pp. 1150-1151).  Although their 
measure for organizational modularity has been recognized by operations management 
researchers (Ethiraj and Levinthal, 2004a; Tu et al., 2004), a more encompassing 
organizational modularity measure beyond the three extant components might be 
necessary to fully reflect this complex construct.  In other words, studies employing the 
Schilling and Steensma (2001) methodology might leave certain features of 
organizational modularity unexplored.  Future research may follow Schilling and 
Steensma’s (2001) instructions to develop a broader organizational modularity measure 
that includes not only tangible contracting components but also intangible governance 
structures such as trust, reputation, and inter-firm social capitals. 
Accordingly, for future modularity research, researchers should perform 
disaggregate level studies to identify a broader set of dependent and independent 
variables and develop pertinent measures.  While this dissertation employed the latest 
available, multiple sources to construct an cross-industry data set, objective data sources 
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are still limited to capture all details of organizational modularity.  For instance, the 
alliance formation component does not distinguish the R&D, production, or marketing 
alliances within an industry.  Management literature has documented a variety of hybrid 
governance structures, e.g. franchising, licensing, outsourcing, etc., that may lead to 
higher modularity (see Boerner and Macher, 2002).  These specific data on extensive 
organizational modularity measure, including tangible inter-firm links and intangible 
links, may be only available through disaggregate data collection.  To obtain richer 
information on inter-firm arrangements, disaggregate level investigations are in order.  
According to our literature review, Worren, Moore, and Cardona (2002) is the only firm 
level, empirical study developing scale for the “modular structure” construct.  However, 
the Worren, Moore, and Cardona (2002) scale only contains limited information for 
modularity components.  With this observation, we propose that different level of 
research, such as industry specific, firm level, or firm specific studies, should investigate 
inter-firm relationships in detail.  Data collection methods, such as survey and case 
studies, can be applied to overcome the limitations of archival data sources mentioned 
previously, and thus complement the extant industry level research  
The prior limitations may jointly lead to the contrary results of regression runs on 
disaggregate modularity components.  Specifically, we obtain unexpected results for 
distribution channel length in the contract manufacturing regression, for input 
heterogeneity in the alternative employment regression, and for demand heterogeneity in 
the alliance formation regression.  Perhaps future modularity research could correct the 




Also, future research may need to track the relevant data streams over time to 
account for the limitations of our cross-sectional data.  Ideally, a study about industry 
level organizational modularity should examine current trends; however, the latest 
available data sources containing all relevant modularity measures prevent us from 
conducting a longitudinal investigation beyond 1997.  We anticipate that this limitation 
can be overcome in the near future with the forthcoming publication of more current data. 
An interesting issue not yet studied in the literature relates to the two-way 
reinforcement between modularity and its driving forces (Schilling and Steensma, 2001).  
More specifically, as organizations adopt hybrid governances to coordinate business 
processes, firms may become better able to develop greater product customization, which 
can eventually lead to more heterogeneous demand, and in turn to a greater variety of 
supply sources.  These structural changes might take time to occur.  Accordingly, cross-
sectional data set is limited to account for the lag effects of the simultaneity between 
drivers and modularity.  Thus, as discussed previously, a time series analysis may be 
necessary for investigating these two-way reinforcement.  Future research might employ 
longitudinal data for investigating this potential interchange between modularity and its 
relevant drivers. 
Another direction for future research pertains to unexplored factors that moderate 
the relationship between and modularity and its determinants.  Management researchers 
have shown that decision making concerning inter-firm governance structure, e.g. 
organizational modularity, can be very complex.  There can be additional variables that 
indirectly reinforce or lessen the motivation associated with inter-firm governance 
structures decisions (Leiblein, Reuer, Dalsace, 2002; Leiblein and Miller, 2003; Schilling 
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and Steensma, 2001).  These moderating variables may include information technologies 
(IT), product modularity, industry employment policies, communication and 
manufacturing standards, etc. (Sturgeon, 2002).  Using IT as an example, manufacturers 
may use inter-organizational information systems or internet connectivity as a 
coordination alternative to contracts.  Several papers have provide researchers with 
abundant discussion on these potential moderating effects which could lead to potential 
testable hypotheses (see Zenger and Hesterly, 1997; Malone, Yates, and Benjamin, 1987; 
Sturgeon, 2002).  With more modularity drivers identified, there are promising 
opportunities for researchers to investigate the interaction between modularity drivers and 
potential moderators. 
Lastly, another data limitation is lack of data for contractors, suppliers, buyers, 
etc., in foreign countries.  In the current context of global outsourcing and international 
alliance formation, the emerging modular networks can oftentimes develop to a global 
scope.  This dissertation only analyzes the modularity practices of U.S. manufacturing 
industries.  In this sense, our data set may underestimate the impacts of modularity 
drivers.  As more organizations extend to international operations, incorporating both 
international and domestic aspects of modular practices may better capture the impacts of 
driving forces on modularity.  To better reflect this reality, we suggest modularity 
researchers use alternative research methods to investigate how the drivers affect 
modularity choices of both domestic and non-U.S. firms. 
Summary 
In this chapter we have presented data analysis procedures and statistical findings.  
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Regression runs strongly support our hypotheses regarding input heterogeneity, focal 
industry scale economies, and downstream industry economies.  The discussion of 
managerial implications may provide guidance for firms in adopting outsourcing 
strategies with supply chain partners.  The discussion on limitation and future research 
may direct researchers to further investigate the modularity phenomenon.  In the next 




CHAPTER 6 CONCLUSIONS 
This first part of the conclusions summarizes major components of the 
dissertation.  Discussion of the contributions of this dissertation follows. 
Summary of Theoretical Framework, Methodology, and Findings 
This dissertation examines the recent phenomenon of organizational modularity.  
Nowadays, many manufacturing firms no longer act as isolated and independent entities. 
Instead, businesses adopt organizational modularity as a strategy to coordinate supply 
chain networks.  Modularity provides strategic flexibility by using integrative inter-firm 
arrangements, such as contracting manufacturing, alternative employment, and alliances.  
The purpose of this dissertation is to investigate the drivers of organizational modularity 
in supply chains.  The drivers this dissertation explored include input and demand 
heterogeneity, length of industrial distribution channels, scale economies, and industry 
concentration. 
Using transaction cost analysis as the overarching theoretical framework for the 
analysis, a number of hypotheses that relate industry structure to modularity are 
developed in an industrial supply chain context.  A conceptual model of the drivers of 
organizational modularity summarizing pertinent hypotheses is also presented.  A large 
scale industry-level data set from public sources is used to test the hypotheses. Statistical 
results show that heterogeneity of supply sources and scale economies in focal and 
downstream industries, are positively associated with greater use of modular 
organizational forms.  Other factors, such as the concentration of upstream and 




This dissertation has made several contributions to the modularity literature on the 
theoretical, methodological, and empirical fronts.  Our first contribution pertains to a new 
perspective of organizational modularity.  By applying Transaction Cost Cconomics 
(TCE) as an overarching theory, this dissertation views organizational modularity as a 
“hybrid” or intermediate governance structure to coordinate supply chain activities.  Past 
modularity literature has viewed organizational modularity as an alternative of vertical 
integration; this dissertation, however, views organizational modularity as an alternative 
to not only vertical integration but also market mechanisms.  Through our TCE-based 
theoretical development, this dissertation has thus re-positioned modularity in the 
pertinent economic organization literature. 
Secondly, this dissertation applies a cross-discipline approach to integrate 
research streams on economic organizations.  We incorporate findings from such fields as 
strategic management, logistics, supply chain management, marketing, and economics.  
This extensive literature review leads us to examine the organizational modularity 
phenomenon in the supply chain context.  We believe that research questions associated 
with the development of modular organizational forms are fundamental supply chain 
management issues.  This view has not been explicitly acknowledged, particularly, in 
strategy, operations, and even in supply chain literature. 
In addition, this dissertation develops a model of the drivers of organizational 
modularity based on the TCE view.  We incorporate the rational views of Mentzer et al. 
(2001) and Porter (1980, 1985) to construct the conceptual model in a supply chain 
setting.  To be more specific, we have a focal manufacturing industry with its 
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primary supplier and customer industries.  This model makes it clear that the driving 
forces of organizational modularity come not only from within the focal industry, but also 
from upstream and downstream industries in the supply chain.  Our conceptual model 
answers the call for an overall theory of organizational modularity that has been cited in 
modularity literature (Langlois, 2002). 
The fourth contribution of this dissertation is the development of variable 
measurements and the configuration of industry level primary supply chains.  Based on 
statistical analyses of our data set, this dissertation provides the first empirical evidence 
on an extensive set of modularity drivers.  Future works on organizational modularity 
may build research on our variable operationlization and data collection techniques. 
Finally, we explore the implications for managers by combining industry 
evidence with our research findings.  The theoretical framework allows managers to 
capture critical determinants of firm-boundary decisions to safeguard contracting 
relationships.  In addition, our findings may provide managers with guidelines for the 
adoption of organizational modularity as an alternative to instituting buyer-supplier 
relationships.  Extant modularity research has contributed knowledge to practitioners in 
terms of the strategic flexibility implications (Schilling and Steensma, 2001).  In contrast, 
this dissertation emphasizes that supply chain members can potentially utilize 
organizational modularity to minimize nontrivial transaction costs.  This emphasis, 
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